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FOREWORD
Locked in a confrontational stance lasting more
than 3 decades, the United States and Iran have failed
repeatedly to transform their hostile relationship. The
ongoing nuclear talks, however, offer better prospects of not only addressing Iran’s nuclear program
challenges, but also developing a mutually beneficial
strategic relationship between the United States and
Iran in the long term. Why are these prospects better today? According to Mr. Roman Muzalevsky, the
coming to power of new presidential administrations
in both countries, the additional sanctions under the
Barack Obama administration, game-changing regional trends, as well as U.S.-Iranian economic and
security cooperation imperatives, have all facilitated
an interim nuclear deal, prompting talks of a promising start in U.S.-Iranian ties that, if cultivated, could
turn into a strategic détente by 2030.
In this analytically rigorous monograph, Mr. Muzalevsky, an author of numerous works on security
and geopolitics, explains these and other geo-economic and geopolitical forces that have been driving a U.S.Iranian détente and presents a vision of three possible
U.S.-Iranian strategic relationships that could emerge
in the next decade and a half. He then provides an
assessment of each possible outcome in terms of its
likelihood and plausibility against domestic and international factors that either facilitate or inhibit related
developments and outcomes, offering short- and longterm recommendations for the United States, Iran, and
their partners to prepare for a strategic change that a
U.S.-Iranian rapprochement would entail. The author
envisions a strategic engagement involving a nuclear
weapons-capable Iran; a comprehensive coopera-
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tion following a “Grand Bargain”; and an incremental strategic engagement after a nuclear deal as three
possibilities, with the latter type combining elements
of the other two without producing “extreme” outcomes. A departure from numerous other works, Mr.
Muzalevsky offers compelling reasons and arguments
to engage a nuclear Iran rather than work to isolate
it—a task necessary to prevent inadvertent conflict
and ensure regional strategic stability in the already
volatile region.
The author’s emphasis on constructive U.S.-Iranian strategic engagement is a fresh and welcome effort to ponder a reformatted relationship between the
long-standing foes in the Greater Middle East and assess likely implications of this dramatic shift on allies,
partners, and general regional dynamics—a task that
Mr. Muzalevsky executes masterfully by providing a
comprehensive and visionary account of alternative
futures and required steps to get to a positive relationship. He argues that, if achieved, a U.S.-Iranian détente would promote internal and external integration
of the Greater Middle East, facilitating the U.S. strategy of fostering global connectivity. A détente, he says,
would also ease regional tensions, create dynamics for
resolution of long-standing conflicts, and stimulate
“development and reconstruction of countries ravaged by wars and sectarian violence”—an imperative
that could not be more urgent given the author’s characterization of the Greater Middle East as the “region
of wars.” According to him, it would also enable the
United States to adjust its global military posture by
deploying some of its regional military assets to other
parts of the world to address other challenges, while
repurposing remaining forces to tackle newly emerging and future threats in the Greater Middle East itself.
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The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer
Mr. Muzalevsky’s work for analysts and policymakers interested in U.S.-Iranian relations, challenges
posed by nuclear weapons and their proliferation, as
well as the future of the Greater Middle East and U.S.
global power.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
The ongoing nuclear talks between Iran and P5+1
following the most stringent sanctions against Iran to
date have opened new prospects for relaxation of tensions between Tehran and the West, and for a U.S.-Iranian détente in the long run. The coming to power of
new presidential administrations in both the United
States and Iran, the additional sanctions, sweeping
geo-economic and geopolitical trends, and U.S.-Iranian cooperation imperatives all contributed to these
dynamics. Some now view the negotiations as a new
beginning in U.S.-Iranian ties, which could herald the
emergence of a U.S.-Iranian strategic relationship in
the next 15 years.
This monograph, written in late-2014, develops
and examines three possible strategic relationships
between Iran and the United States that could emerge
by 2030: 1) strategic engagement involving a nuclear
weapons-capable Iran; 2) comprehensive cooperation following a “Grand Bargain”; and, 3) incremental
strategic engagement after a nuclear deal. These relationships deliberately focus on constructive engagement, skipping the status quo and a strike on Iran as
other possible outcomes. While it does not identify the
winner, this monograph assesses the plausibility and
likelihood of each relationship emerging and recommends policies to cultivate and prepare the United
States, Iran, and their partners for a strategic change.
A resulting U.S.-Iranian relationship would probably rest on common policies on select issues rather
than look like a full-blown strategic partnership, which
is unlikely in the next 15 years as the parties need to
rebuild trust and realign policies with their allies and
partners. Such a relationship would thus likely rest
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on the principle and practice of selective engagement,
but with an understanding and direction to a more
full-fledged strategic relationship in the longer term.
If accomplished by 2030, a U.S.-Iranian détente
would advance external integration of the Greater
Middle East, aiding the U.S. strategy of fostering
global connectivity. It would promote relaxation of
tensions, resolution of conflicts, and development
and reconstruction of countries ravaged by wars and
sectarian violence. It would also enable the United
States to deploy select regional military assets to other
locales, such as Asia and Europe, to deal with other
challenges while repurposing its remaining assets to
address new threats in the Greater Middle East.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION:
THE TIME HAS COME
Roman Muzalevsky
We remain a young nation, but in the words of Scripture, the time has come to set aside childish things.
Barack Obama, January 20, 2009. 1

The nuclear talks between Iran and P5+1 (the five
United Nations [UN] Security Council nuclear powers: the United States, Britain, France, Russia, and
China, plus Germany) over Tehran’s controversial nuclear program following the most stringent sanctions
against Iran to date have opened new prospects for
relaxation of tensions between Tehran and the West
and for a U.S.-Iranian détente in the long run. The
coming to power of new presidential administrations
in both the United States and Iran, the additional sanctions, sweeping geo-economic and geopolitical trends,
as well as U.S.-Iranian economic and security cooperation imperatives, all contributed to these positive
dynamics.
The change of two consecutive presidential administrations in the United States and Iran in 2008
and 2013, respectively, facilitated the conclusion of an
“interim nuclear deal” in 2013, which the parties extended twice in 2014, agreeing to reach a final accord
by June 1, 2015. This became possible after the election
and reelection of Barack Obama as U.S. President in
2008 and 2012, which ushered in an era of a less assertive U.S. foreign policy, with the new administration
emphasizing diplomacy and engagement with the
1

world. This posture has coincided with Washington’s
diminishing global influence amid the rise of new
power centers and enormous fiscal challenges that
have undermined the U.S. global role. This posture
has forced U.S. leadership to focus more on domestic
concerns following years of failing U.S. war efforts in
Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as diplomacy and engagement on global issues in an effort to reverse its
declining global influence.
Meanwhile, severe economic challenges and proreform “Green Movement” protests have forced the
Iranian leadership to loosen its grip, facilitating the
emergence of more moderate forces calling for engagement—not estrangement—with the world. The
additional sanctions imposed on Iran by Washington and its partners in 2012 aggravated the already
weakened Iranian economy, encouraging Tehran to
switch tactics, if not yet strategy, and engage with
the P5+1 as part of the nuclear negotiations in 2013
rather than continue on an isolationist course. The additional sanctions caused a significant decline in oil
exports, reduced government revenues, contributed
to depreciation of local currency, and exacerbated
socio-economic challenges. The defeat of conservative
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who had served
two consecutive terms, and the election as president in
June 2013 of Hassan Rouhani, a moderate cleric who
had once served as Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator, has
created more room for domestic and foreign policy
changes in these conditions, including as they concern
the nuclear talks. Already in November, Iran and the
P5+1 powers struck the “interim nuclear deal,” agreeing to remove sanctions and bring billions of dollars
in sanctions relief to Iran in return for Tehran freezing
or rolling back elements of its nuclear program and
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committing to reach a “comprehensive solution” by
mutually agreed deadlines. This has allowed Tehran
to alleviate its economic problems while leaving a
door open for resolution of its grievances as part of
the ongoing and future talks with the major powers.
Meanwhile, a series of geo-economic and geopolitical trends and cooperation imperatives have been
driving a U.S.-Iranian détente in the long run. Iran has
one of the world’s largest concentrations of oil and
gas resources and serves as a bridge for the emerging
transcontinental network of energy, trade, and transit links serving markets throughout Eurasia. It has a
very young and dynamic labor pool, as well as large
economic sectors suffering from the lack of foreign
direct investment (FDI) and modernization. It further
displays an untapped trade capacity with the West
and could serve as a source of reconstruction and
development assistance to war-torn countries in the
Greater Middle East. This is a prospect that the United
States should exploit as it seeks to enhance global connectivity and contribute to the development and stability of Eurasia, which is reconnecting at a rapid pace
due to the rise of India, China, Russia, and Turkey,
among other actors. Washington should ensure it is in
a position to shape this historic process by leveraging
the geo-economic and geostrategic position of Iran,
which borders conflict-stricken parts of the greater
region requiring development and integration into
the global economic order. In this context, the rise of
the United States as a global energy player, Iran’s role
as an energy producer and transit state, and potential
U.S.-Iranian economic cooperation have far-reaching
implications for global development, geopolitics, and
a U.S.-Iranian strategic relationship.

3

The geo-economic trends and merits of U.S.-Iranian economic engagement complement the importance
and sweep of geopolitical dynamics and U.S.-Iranian
security cooperation imperatives. The raging civil
and proxy wars throughout the Greater Middle East
and developments stemming from the Arab Spring
have altered the geopolitical landscape of the region,
prompting Washington and Iran to consider engagement as part of the talks and even ponder possible
cooperation on select regional challenges as they seek
to bring stability to the region. While Iran’s regional
position has strengthened vis-à-vis the United States
following the toppling of the Taliban in Afghanistan
and Saddam Hussein in Iraq, Iran has proven unable
to force game-changing outcomes. By the same token,
the United States, while still the most formidable military power, is no longer in a position to force regional
dynamics without substantially damaging its already
weakened regional standing. Neither Iran, nor Washington today is able to address effectively—certainly
not alone—the numerous security challenges emanating from Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Lebanon,
and Yemen, among other states. These countries are
experiencing civil wars and sectarian violence threatening their disintegration, with the struggle between
Shia and Sunni factions backed by rivals Iran and
Saudi Arabia respectively assuming alarming dimensions. The persistent conflict between secularist and
Islamist forces and the emergence of the Islamic State
(IS), which has conquered parts of Iraq and Syria after
waging both unconventional and traditional warfare,
has undermined further the already fragile regional
security order and raised concerns about the future of
the entire region.

4

In these conditions, Iran and the United States
need each other to address common economic and
security challenges, and many view the nuclear talks
as the start of a new chapter in the more than 3 decades of estranged relations between the two countries. A thawing in U.S.-Iranian ties could herald the
emergence of a U.S.-Iranian strategic engagement in
the next 15 years, which would change fundamentally
global and regional dynamics, with major implications for the U.S. global military posture and regional
stability. As the United States and Iran continue on the
presumed trajectory of gradually improving relations,
Washington and its allies should be prepared for this
dramatic shift, regardless of whether or not Iran “goes
nuclear.” No one knows when or if this shift would
occur, or what a U.S.-Iranian strategic détente might
look like. From a U.S. perspective, it would ideally
rest—among other attributes—on U.S. cooperation
with an Iran that:
• does not possess or seek nuclear weapons;
• does not engage in terrorism targeting the
United States and its allies;
• does not pursue policies hostile to Washington
and its allies;
• does not menace Israel; and,
• supports U.S. policies pursuing the development and integration of the Greater Middle
East into the global economy and rules-based
regimes.
From Iran’s standpoint, such a relationship would
ideally rest—among other considerations—on cooperation with Washington that:
• acknowledges Iran’s right to pursue nuclear
power for civilian purposes;
• renounces regime change as a policy;
5

• stops supporting proxies of Iran’s perceived
regional enemies;
• removes sanctions and releases frozen assets;
• assists Iran with modernization and integration
into the global economy;
• recognizes Iran’s interests and status as a rising
regional power; and,
• makes pertinent changes to its military posture
in terms of capabilities and intent.
This work has developed three types of a U.S.Iranian strategic relationship and dynamics that could
emerge by 2030:
1. strategic engagement involving a nuclear weapons-capable Iran;
2. comprehensive cooperation following a “Grand
Bargain”; and,
3. incremental strategic engagement after a
nuclear deal.
The parties get to the first dynamic after Iran stalls
for time, improves ties with the United States on a
limited level, and then admits to having a nuclear
weapons capability, which probably would prompt
a more substantive engagement between Tehran and
Washington that seeks to maintain strategic stability
while cooperating on other issues of mutual concern.
The sides achieve the second dynamic after they make
a “U” turn and reach a “Grand Bargain,” leading to
comprehensive cooperation. They arrive at the third
dynamic after addressing Iran’s nuclear program
issues, reaping the benefits of an incremental, yet
increasingly strategic, engagement as they tackle security challenges together and in concert with other
actors. These types of a strategic relationship and
related dynamics—while overlapping—deliberately
6

focus on a constructive U.S.-Iranian engagement regardless of whether Iran gets the “nukes,” skipping
a prevalent discussion on two other possibilities: the
status quo, which would continue to entrench the
hostile relationship; and a U.S., Israeli, or U.S.-Israeli
strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities, which would lead to
systemic perturbation in the region.
While it does not identify the winner, this monograph assesses the plausibility and likelihood of each
relationship emerging and provides policy recommendations to cultivate and prepare the United States,
Iran, and their partners for a strategic change due to
a comprehensive nuclear deal and the likely emergence of a strategic relationship between Iran and the
United States by 2030. A resulting strategic relationship would probably rest on common policies on select issues rather than look like a full-blown strategic
partnership, which is unlikely in the next 15 years as
the parties need to rebuild trust and adjust or realign
policies with their allies and partners. Such a relationship would likely rest on the principle and practice of
selective engagement, but with an understanding and
direction to a more full-fledged strategic relationship
in the longer term. Even if the parties achieve a “Grand
Bargain,” they would need time to translate the vision
into action, making the incremental and selective strategic engagement a more likely scenario. The challenge
of improving Iranian-Israeli and the Iranian-Saudi Arabic relations would demand utmost creativity on the
parts of Washington, Tel-Aviv, Riyadh, and Tehran.
While Israel and Saudi Arabia would be pressured to
seek accommodation with Iran following a nuclear
deal or amid a strategic détente between the United
States and Iran, they would proceed gradually given
their fundamental disagreements over status, power,
and security issues in the broader region.
7

If accomplished by 2030, a U.S.-Iranian strategic
détente would generate positive developments in
the greater region, even if Iran eventually acquires
nuclear weapons capability—not an ideal but potentially manageable outcome. In the economic realm,
it would advance modernization and integration of
Iran’s outdated economy into regional and global networks, with pertinent implications for liberalization
of Iran’s domestic and foreign policy in the long run.
It would enable Central and South Asian states to expand their own external integration, aiding the U.S.
strategy of fostering global connectivity in the process. It would also promote development and reconstruction of countries ravaged by wars and sectarian
violence. In the security realm, it would advance security cooperation mechanisms, relaxation of tensions,
and resolution of long-standing conflicts, contributing
to regional stability. It would also facilitate the U.S.
military policy of protecting allies and sea lanes along
the greater region’s perimeter, enabling it to devote
some of its regional military assets to other locales to
deal with other challenges, as in Asia and Central and
Eastern Europe, as well as to repurpose its remaining
forces to address new threats in the same region. It
would allow Washington, Iran, and their partners to
more effectively tackle existing and emerging challenges in the Greater Middle East.
The time to engage Iran has come, and it should
not raise the fear of desertion or “Armageddon.”
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1
1. Quoted in Dana H. Allin and Steven Simon, The Sixth Crisis:
Iran, Israel, America, and the Rumors of War, Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press, 2010, p. 133.
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CHAPTER 2
FORCES DRIVING U.S.-IRANIAN DÉTENTE
A problem is solved when it gets tougher.
An Arab proverb.1

NEW ADMINISTRATIONS AND THE
POTENTIAL FOR CHANGE
When Barack Obama assumed the U.S. presidency
in 2009, he emphasized engagement with the world,
especially Muslim countries, that continue pointing
to the devastating consequences of U.S. policies that
have allegedly brought wars and misery rather than
democracy and prosperity. The change in U.S. foreign
policy rhetoric from one of assertion to one of humility was a major boost to deadlocked talks between
Iran and the P5+1 (the United States, Britain, France,
Russia, and China, plus Germany), with the Obama
administration undertaking engagement with Iran in
order to seal a nuclear deal and to lay the foundation
for improvement of their estranged ties in the long
run. Importantly, the change in U.S. foreign policy approach signaled the need for the United States to “restore balance in domestic and international politics”
and “shift focus to the home front” after costly wars
of the previous administration, the effect of the global
financial crisis, and a looming age of austerity due to
U.S. mushrooming federal debt.2 Like Obama, Iran’s
new president, moderate cleric Hassan Rouhani, has
sought to tilt the balance between domestic and foreign policy by pursuing policy changes in Iran’s relations with the world amid debilitating economic sanctions, severe socio-economic challenges, and popular
frustrations with the regime.
9

While it signaled Washington’s willingness to
change course, the U.S. outreach to Iran during
Obama’s first term yielded no substantial progress,
constrained as it was by policy inertia from the George
W. Bush administration’s stance centered on isolation
of Iran, regime change, and willingness to engage
Tehran in negotiations only if it agreed to halt uranium enrichment. The new administration was further
constrained by:
• resistance from the U.S. Congress, which has
emphasized punitive measures against Iran3
and displayed a pro-Israel position that Iran
should either halt uranium enrichment or face
comprehensive sanctions and a potential military attack;
• the pro-Israel and the pro-Arab lobby groups,4
which have resisted U.S. initiatives advancing
negotiations with Iran without substantial and
verifiable concessions from Tehran; and
• a stance by Principalists in Iran led by the conservative former President Ahmadinejad (with
the conservative cleric and Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Khamenei playing a mediating role
between the Principalists and Reformers),
who occasionally rebuffed U.S. engagement attempts, citing Washington’s lack of respect.
The lack of understanding in Washington of diverging views of different power centers in Iran, and
Iran’s lack of understanding of divergent stances by
the legislative and executive branches of the U.S. Government, have impeded engagement further, raising
suspicions of “good cop, bad cop” games.5
This is not to obscure the active role of the pro-Iran
lobby in prompting Washington to pursue the talks.6

10

Iran itself reached out to the U.S. administration seeking negotiations multiple times, but the forces of resistance were too strong and circumstances of outreach were perceived as too unfavorable.7 However,
the 2005 election and re-election of Ahmadinejad for
the second term as president in 2009, the associated
consolidation of power by Principalists, and the subsequent crackdown by the regime in Tehran against
“Green Movement” supporters protesting electoral
fraud—all worked against progress in the talks and
engagement.8 By 2009, the lack of progress prompted
Washington to emphasize its “two track strategy” by
applying additional economic pressure and offering
sanctions relief to Iran in an effort to encourage the
nuclear talks.9
The exit of Ahmadinejad and the coming in June
2013 of a moderate cleric, Hassan Rouhani, Iran’s
chief nuclear negotiator during 2003-05, opened new
prospects for engagement in nuclear talks. Iran and
the P5+1 concluded an “interim nuclear deal” in November 2013, extended it first in July 2014 and then in
November 2014, agreeing to continue the talks until
March 2015. The parties plan to reach a political framework by then and possibly continue the negotiations
until June 2015 in order to reach a final accord. The
“interim nuclear deal” provided anywhere between
$U.S.7-20 billion in sanctions relief to Iran in exchange
for Iran freezing or rolling back all elements of its
nuclear program. Sanctions were lifted in the automobile, precious metals, and petrochemical industries.
Iran agreed to a 5 percent enrichment cap, to eliminate
its stockpile of 20 percent low enriched uranium, to
limit the number of spinning centrifuges, and to allow intrusive inspections by the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA), among other conditions of

11

the agreement. The deal mirrors Iran’s 2005 proposal
which the Bush administration, emboldened after the
toppling of the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam
Hussein in Iraq, rejected because it enshrined Iran’s
right to continue enriching uranium permanently. The
interim deal, however, states that “a comprehensive
solution would involve a mutually defined [uranium]
enrichment program with practical limits and transparency measures to ensure the peaceful nature of
the program.”10 Washington’s willingness to adjust
its position from “no enrichment of uranium” to “no
nuclear bomb” has been a strong factor in prompting the moderate administration to agree to the
“interim” deal.11
The end of two consecutive Republican presidential administrations in the United States in 2008
and two consecutive conservative presidential administrations in Iran in 2013 created an opening for
the pursuit of the talks. A successful progress in the
negotiations or their conclusion through a mutually
agreed nuclear deal presents historic opportunities
for Obama and Rouhani to entrench their legacies and
generate political capital for their ideological camps.
This effort would surely confront enormous resistance
from all quarters, at home and abroad. U.S. partners,
especially Saudi Arabia and Israel, are extremely cautious and oppose any type of rapprochement with
Iran that would not serve their national interests as
they relate to Tehran’s nuclear program and Iran’s
regional agenda. As Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu remarked, Rouhani plans to “smile all the
way to the bomb,” highlighting a possible attempt by
Tehran to stall for time as part of a “charm offensive”
by the Rouhani administration.12 A full Republican
control of the U.S. Congress following the congressio-
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nal elections in November 2014 and the complicated
political system in Iran, as well the gravitas of Khamenei and his allies, will continue to challenge respective
presidential administrations and the prospects of improved U.S.-Iranian ties in the long run. A comeback
of a new presidential administration in either country
could set the clock back further, despite pressures on a
new administration to continue the course of a previous one, at least in the United States.13 But the overall
trajectory has offered prospects brighter than is generally assumed when it comes to a possible U.S.-Iranian
strategic détente in the long run.
Iran’s foreign policy over the past 2 decades has
seen significant moderation, with Tehran focusing
more on national interests than revolutionary ideology as the guiding principle and reaching détente
with states in the European Union (EU), the Persian
Gulf, the Caucasus, and Central and South-East Asia,
in part as a way to compensate for its estranged relationship with the United States.14 It has restarted diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom (UK) and
built especially strong economic and political ties with
Turkey, Russia, and China, leading to a notable thaw
in relations with major players since the P5+1 concluded the “interim” deal in 2013.15 Both the United
States and Iran also have a history of cooperative policies pursued by different administrations.16 Reformist
and moderate administrations were in place under
former presidents Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and
Mohammad Khatemi in Iran in the 1900s and 2000s,
while Rouhani’s flexible approach to foreign policy
could yet result in major changes to the dialogue that
some pragmatists in Iran describe as “neither wine,
nor prayer” (i.e., neither prohibited, nor obligatory).17
The current administrations in the United States and
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Iran thus need to sustain the momentum of cooperative dynamics and expand it institutionally into the
next administrations. They also need to exercise patience and put a premium on long-term progress in
the face of institutional resistance.18 As they do so,
the issue of remaining and possible future sanctions
will be a major challenge given their impact on Iran’s
willingness to engage in the talks under the “interim”
deal, and the general dynamics that might bring the
two countries to accommodation and détente in the
long run.
THE BITE OF SANCTIONS AS THE STIMULUS
FOR NEGOTIATIONS
Under the Obama administration, the United States
has undertaken an enhanced “dual track” approach
toward Iran, pursuing ever-crippling sanctions and
engagement while dropping its long-standing condition that Iran first suspend its uranium enrichment. In
2011, it imposed sanctions on Iran’s Central Bank and
its lifeline oil exports, arranging for additional sanctions. Whether it was the major factor prompting Iran’s
engagement in the talks is debatable, but it certainly
encouraged Iran to cooperate.19 As Ahmadinejad noted, the latest sanctions were “the most extensive . . .
sanctions ever” and that “this is the heaviest economic onslaught on a nation in history . . . every day, all
our banking and trade activities and our agreements
are being monitored and blocked.”20 Meanwhile, the
large-scale anti-government protests in 2009, amid
electoral fraud allegations against Ahmadinejad, provided another stimulus for engagement in the talks in
hopes of relieving not only the economic but also the
political pressures built up over the years.
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A brief review of the Iranian economy is needed
to understand the impact of sanctions and sanctions
relief. The Iranian economy ranks 19th in the world
based on purchasing power parity, with its gross domestic product in 2013 estimated at $U.S.987 billion.
The country ranks 2nd and 5th in world proven gas and
oil reserves, making it a critical link in global energy
balances amid the rise of new power centers and the
search by countries for uninterrupted and diversified
energy supplies. Iran displays a tremendous potential
as a global, let alone regional, player. But its economic
performance is severely constrained. Its private sector
is highly underdeveloped, while the state-dominated
economic sectors are inefficient and underperforming. Unemployment is at about 16 percent, with unemployment for youth between ages 15-24 at about 23
percent. Inflation in 2013 hit a striking 42.3 percent,
but declined to about 21 percent in 2014 following the
election of Rouhani.21 Skilled labor and technology
investments are severely lacking. Iran’s major export
partners include China (22.1 percent), India (11.9 percent), Turkey (10.6 percent), South Korea (7.6 percent),
and Japan (7.1 percent). Its major import partners are
the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (33.2 percent), China
(13.8 percent), Turkey (11.8 percent), and South Korea
(7.4 percent). The sanctions reduced Iran’s oil exports
by 50 percent (Iran’ petroleum exports constituted 80
percent of all exports in 2013), cut government spending, and led to the depreciation of the currency by 60
percent, causing negative economic growth in both
2012 and 2013 for the first time in 20 years.22
The “Green Movement” anti-government protests
in 2009 against electoral fraud underscored the precarious position of the ruling elites in Iran, even if they
catered to the needs of a largely urbanite and middle
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class citizenry and failed to galvanize rural segments
of the society—the backbone of popular support for
the regime. Ultimately stifled, protesters voiced both
political and economic demands, reflecting the need
for the statist political and economic regime to engage
in reform or face resistance, even if insubstantial.23 The
electoral victory by Rouhani in June 2013 is therefore a
vote of confidence by the Supreme Leader and Iranian
people, a concession by the regime keen on avoiding
social rifts, and a “green light” for promoting change,
given the imperatives for reforms in domestic and
foreign policy realms.24 Iran’s desire to conclude the
“interim” deal is therefore not surprising, but does
not necessarily indicate Iran’s readiness to pursue
a greater engagement with the United States after a
nuclear deal is achieved. Khamenei views the United
States as the main rival, and his policy of “heroic flexibility” enabling Tehran to find a balance and compromise in domestic and foreign policies, may be a way to
use “flexible tactics” to score political, economic, and
military dividends in the overall contest with Washington. Khamenei stated that “nobody should believe
that the enemies of the Islamic revolution have given
up their enmity,” while offering hope of engagement
stating that “the Islamic Republic will negotiate with
the Satan on specific issues that are of interest.”25
The lifting of $U.S.7-20 billion in sanctions, including related long-term positive ripple effects on the
economy, has demonstrated for Iran the untapped
potential of its engagement with the world, while
strengthening the hands of Reformers and moderates
in Iran who have been marginalized over the last decade but have now emerged as a stronger force keen
on winning overwhelming popular support for its incipient yet potentially “revolutionary” domestic and
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foreign policies. The resultant economic gains for Iran
now and in the future could help ensure that it turns
into an engaged, not estranged, power that is willing to assuage the security concerns of its neighbors
while reaping the economic benefits of its increasingly
global engagement. This is especially important because sanctions imposed on Iran in recent years have
shifted its trade with largely market economies to its
trade with largely authoritarian states.26 On the other
hand, the sanctions relief could help bring Iran closer
to nuclear weapons if, following the “interim” and a
final nuclear deal, it continues to or starts pursuing a
nuclear weapons capability in secrecy and under the
cover of ever-expanding economic relations with P5+1
and other actors.27
Just as Obama did, Rouhani has positioned himself as a president keen on bringing change. But, like
Obama, Rouhani is yet to confront a full spectrum of
resistance from foreign and domestic circles to his initiatives, making it imperative for the Obama administration to solidify its position in the ongoing negotiations and achieve the sought-after outcomes sooner
rather than later. Arguably, similar logic should dictate the approach of Rouhani’s administration, which
has a chance to strengthen its position in Iran’s domestic politics and amplify the voice of Reformers. A
failure to conclude a deal could result in harsher sanctions yet, or worse—an attack on Iran. This would be a
disaster and a lost opportunity, considering the merits
of economic and security cooperation between Washington and Tehran on a broad range of global and
regional issues, which have been driving a long-term
U.S-Iranian détente for years, despite strong obstacles.
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GEO-ECONOMIC TRENDS AND THE MERITS
OF ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT
Geo-economic trends unfolding in the Greater
Middle East, and concerning the United States, make
the merits of U.S.-Iranian economic engagement all
too clear. An economic engagement between the two
countries would advance the regional and global economic integration and help Iran modernize and integrate its economy with global networks. Importantly,
it would help address global and regional energy security needs, promoting a diversified uninterrupted,
and secure supply of energy sources to global markets, while contributing to global economic growth.
A fuller integration of Iran into the global economic architecture would have a transformative impact
on Iran and the U.S.-Iranian strategic relationship. It
would also spur a faster, already ongoing integration
of the landlocked but energy-rich Central Asia and energy-poor South Asia into the global economic system.
Currently, energy, trade, and transit companies and
developers shun Iran, forestalling the inter-regional
integration of these areas on terms that Washington
could shape were it to engage Iran. The economic and
geopolitical benefits for the United States of integrating Iran into the continental economy are enormous.
Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, and other countries in
the Middle East would have more opportunities for
development. The Central Asian states of Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan
would be relieved from geopolitical and geo-economic pressure exerted by Russia and China. Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and India would have expanded access to
Iran’s vast energy resources and use its geo-economic
location to address their reconstruction, energy defi-
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cits, and modernization needs. An economically prosperous and politically stable Greater Middle East is a
U.S. strategic interest.
The lifting of sanctions on Iran’s oil sector and normalization of U.S.-Iranian relations would enable Iran
to diversify its export base from an overwhelming reliance on Asian markets, while expanding Iran’s revenue
base to advance modernization of its underperforming economy. A 2008 study by the National Foreign
Trade Council indicates that increased oil production
by Iran following the removal of sanctions might have
decreased the market price of crude oil by 10 percent
and saved the United States billions of dollars.28 Both
Iran and American corporations would be interested
in bringing U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) and
the latest technologies to develop energy and other
sectors of the Iranian economy. Iran’s oil sector alone
requires at least $U.S.200 billion for upgrades and
expansions, as well as 2.5 times more in investments
than the country’s total annual development budget
in order to “save” Iran’s oil infrastructure.29 A U.S.Iranian economic engagement would also stimulate
more cooperative policies between Arab states and
Iran, enabling them to coordinate more effectively oil
production and export policies which could advance
collaboration in other areas in the future (Saudi Arabia and Iran cooperated heavily on matters regarding
oil production and exports in the 2000s, at least on
the declaratory level30). This is important given recent
energy export interruptions in Libya and the raging
civil and proxy wars in Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and
Afghanistan that threaten the already complex mosaic
of energy developments in the greater region which
Iran’s involvement could help address.
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The issue of global and regional energy security
is highly complex, defined by uninterrupted and safe
access, exploitation, transit, and use of diverse energy
resources by regimes ranging from authoritarian and
democratic to theocratic and nationalistic. Iran and
the United States—both major global energy exporters
serving the needs of established and emerging power
centers that are challenging patterns of resource flows
across the planet—could work together to advance energy security cooperation in the future. A recent rise
of the United States as a major global energy producer
and a projected rise of Iran as a transcontinental energy bridge and exporter as part of its full-fledged global engagement are yet to impact overall on the energy
landscapes. The development of fracking technologies
turned the United States from an energy importer just
years ago into one of the world’s largest energy exporters, while the lifting of sanctions on Iran and projected
modernization of its energy sector would usher in a
more geo-economically active role by Iran in global
energy markets. The U.S. energy revolution, also extending into alternative energy developments, creates
more room for maneuver, including in U.S. relations
with Iran. The U.S. Energy Information Administration forecasts that by 2020, the United States might
become the world’s largest oil producer, and energy
self-sufficient by 2035.31 These prospects prompt fears
of U.S. abandonment of its Arab Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) partners.32 But Washington should not
underestimate its energy dependence on the Persian
Gulf, given U.S import of goods produced in Europe
and Asia using either Iranian oil or oil passing through
the Gulf.33 Moreover, it confronts energy security challenges facing its European and North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) allies, which depend heavily on
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Russia’s energy exports. An Iran that is more friendly
and secure can help address both challenges.
Ranked 2nd and 4th in the world’s proven gas and
oil reserves and an Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) member, Iran has and will
continue to be at the forefront of great power politics,
with traditional powers and newly emerging economic giants factoring its vast energy resources and
transit capacity into their strategies. But this untapped
potential could only be turned into a strategic advantage if concerned parties integrate Iran’s economy into
global networks—a task that seems impossible without mending ties between Iran, Washington, and their
partners. That Iran may face oil shortages already by
2030, or run out of oil by 2020 if global oil consumption picks up (assuming Iran has less than half of the
oil reserves it claims), adds urgency to this imperative, given the need for a more efficient energy sector
and economic diversification in Iran to forestall the
collapse of its economy or “adventurism” with negative consequences for regional and global stability.34
Larger exports of U.S. and Iranian oil and gas would
help stabilize global oil prices and the more variable
gas prices. The price of Brent crude oil, for instance,
has fallen by almost 25 percent since mid-June 2014
from $115 at its peak to $87 a barrel at its bottom, with
structural factors, China’s slowdown, and stagnation
in the EU holding back any increase in the price in
the short term, considering also projected increases in
oil production in North America and the hesitancy of
OPEC to cut production.35 Iran’s oil exports in particular would stabilize price dynamics while diversifying the pool of available energy resources for EU and
Central Asian countries, which overly depend on suppliers occasionally resorting to bullying tactics to ad-
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vance their agendas. The United States could be more
at ease knowing that its European partners can lessen
their dependence on imports from Russia, which has
used energy exports as a coercion tool in the past. Iran,
for instance, expressed an interest as recently as 2010
in supplying gas to the long-overdue Nabucco pipeline designed to mitigate EU dependence on Russian
gas by allowing the EU to import more gas from the
Middle East, the Caspian, and Central Asia.36 Russia
itself would see more incentives to diversify its energy
exports-dependent economy, including by pursuing
more liberal policies that, with time, could ensure a
more friendly foreign policy course by the Kremlin
toward neighbors and distant partners, including the
United States and Iran.
The geo-economic trends and merits of U.S.-Iranian economic engagement and energy security cooperation imperatives encourage Iran and Washington
to seek a nuclear deal and strategic engagement. The
benefits of economic engagement would extend to the
military realm, given the relaxation of tensions in the
region following a nuclear agreement, allowing Iran
and the United States to dedicate fewer military resources to protecting economic interests on sea lanes
or land routes. As a result, Washington could use
freed-up resources elsewhere, including in the Pacific, while Iran could focus on modernization of its
underdeveloped economy and armed forces. (Some
estimates indicate that Iran has been allocating merely
25 percent of funding required to modernize and recapitalize its armed forces to the level seen under the
Shah Muhammad Reza37). But it is the volatile geopolitical dynamics and security cooperation imperatives
that more vividly highlight the benefits of U.S.-Iranian
cooperation in the short term and their strategic ties in
the long run.
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GEOPOLITICAL DYNAMICS AND SECURITY
COOPERATION IMPERATIVES
Raging civil and proxy wars in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Yemen, and Afghanistan are undermining U.S. capacity to lead and sustain regional security
orders and the global security architecture, making it
imperative to engage key regional actors in shaping
regional stability. This is all the more important, given the diminishing profile of the United States in the
Greater Middle East and the growing regional influence of Iran, which enhances the need—exercised effectively by Tehran and Washington prior to the 1979
Islamic Revolution—for regional security cooperation.
Neither Washington nor Tehran benefits from regional insecurity, but both could gain by bringing stability to Shia-populated Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Yemen, and Afghanistan and by ensuring secure transit
of energy resources via the Persian Gulf and Iran. To
understand the benefits of such security cooperation
and the stimulus it provides for reaching a U.S-Iranian
détente, one must dissect the relative positions of the
United States and Iran in the Greater Middle East in
light of the “Arab Spring,” ongoing civil and proxy
wars in the region, as well as the overall political
and military struggle between regional Islamist and
secularist forces.
The “Arab Spring” and recent security developments in the Greater Middle East have caught the
United States off guard. The Obama administration
either did not support or was slow in supporting the
powers-that-be, the Islamist, and secularist forces
before, during, and after the overthrow or change of
regimes in Tunis, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen.38 This is
despite an arguable observation that Obama’s policy,
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unlike his predecessor’s, has emphasized a stake not
just in the stability of regional countries, “but in the
self-determination of individuals.”39
Washington chose to support the Islamists but was
unprepared for a come-back to power by the military
in Egypt, which has no stamina for an assertive regional role that it traditionally had exercised as a regional balancer, including vis-à-vis Iran. The United
States drew a “red line” for the use of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) by the embattled Syrian regime
of President Bashar al-Assad, but did not intervene
after the regime crossed this line by killing approximately 1,000 people in 2012 and 2013 using chemical
weapons. Russia’s convenient offer to arrange for the
dismantling and transfer of the weapons out of Syria
helped Washington save face, but the violation of its
own commitment undermined U.S. credibility and deterrence capabilities.40 Nor did Washington prevent,
mitigate, or respond effectively to insecurity in Libya,
where an Islamist attack in Benghazi killed its ambassador, and rival militias continue undermining the
formation of a unity government and stability of energy exports. It failed to respond effectively in Bahrain
when Saudi Arabia and the UAE dispatched troops
to suppress pro-reform Shia anti-government forces.
Unsuccessful U.S. campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan
and security challenges posed by IS in Iraq, Syria, and
areas close to Turkey have further undercut the U.S.
regional role, highlighting the need for Washington to
seek allies to stabilize the flaring region.
These volatile dynamics prompted some to draw
a parallel between the diminished influence of Great
Britain in the Middle East after World War II and the
end of the short-lived unipolar moment of the United
States after the Cold War, along with U.S. receding
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influence in the Middle East, where local actors feel
increasingly comfortable challenging U.S. interests,
positions, and counsel.41 Iran is one of them, poised
to use the political awakening of regional societies to
enhance its position, as the region’s “balance of power
is becoming . . . a balance of influence.”42
The U.S. declining regional status is in contrast to
the growing position of Iran, which has grown stronger following the “Arab Spring,” the U.S. toppling of
its Taliban foe in Afghanistan in 2011, and the removal
of a rival regime and dismantling of Saddam Hussein’s army in Iraq in 2003. As former Iranian President
Khatami quipped: “Regardless of where the United
States changes regimes, it is our friends who will
come to power.”43 Iran now exploits the growing role
of civil societies in pressuring Arab regimes, though
the combination of its own and regional popular frustrations have also challenged the Iranian regime, just
as domestic forces have emerged in Iran that shape
domestic and regional narratives.44 Iran’s Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps relies on the Qods Force,
numbering 10,000-15,000, to support pro-Iranian forces in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, Arab GCC states,
Gaza/West Bank, Afghanistan, South Caucasus, and
Central Asia.45
In Iraq, Iran’s support for Shia militias has marginalized Sunni forces and led to the emergence of a
relatively stronger pro-Iranian religious and political
leadership in Baghdad amid frequent anti-Shia militant attacks. Iran provides Shia rebels in Iraq with
military and technological support in the form of improvised explosive devices and explosively-formed
penetrators.46 It also backs political forces, including
the Dawa party and the Islamic Supreme Council of
Iraq. In Syria, it supports Assad’s Alawite faction fi-
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nancially and militarily, using Hezbollah and its Qods
forces on the ground to counter rebels supported by
Arab states and the United States. In Yemen, it supports Shia Houthi rebels whose recent takeover of the
capital, Sana’a, has brought to the group major geopolitical gains in the battle between Sunni and Shia factions throughout the region. In Lebanon, it provides
significant financial and military support to Hamas in
Gaza and Hezbollah, making it an important player in
the Arab-Israeli conflict and a key to its resolution. In
Afghanistan, it helped Washington and the Northern
Alliance overthrow the Taliban and is now projecting
meaningful economic and political influence in the
country due to proximity, common cultural heritage,
ties to the Afghan Shia Hazara population, growing
economic penetration (trade, transit, and construction
industries), and political influence extending to antiand pro-Taliban Sunni factions.47 In South Caucasus,
it actively supports Shia groups in Azerbaijan while
expanding ties to Christian Armenia and Georgia.48 In
a move meant to showcase its rising profile, Iran even
sailed two war ships via the Suez Canal soon after the
popular uprising in Egypt in 2011.49 Iran’s growing
profile helps it cope with a perceived loss of grandeur
since the 16th century, when Iranian empires lost
Bahrain (1521), Baghdad (1638), the Caucasus (1828),
western Afghanistan (1857), Baluchistan (1872), and
areas of present-day Turkmenistan (1894).50
Iran is a geopolitically dynamic state due to its
immense resource wealth, fervent ideology, military
capabilities, extensive network of allies, large population, and strategic location. Rich in energy resources
and straddling three volatile regions, it underwent
an Islamic Revolution that replaced the monarchy
and has struggled to reconcile democratic and Is-
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lamic principles. It has been effectively building alliances with state and nonstate groups despite Western
sanctions and resistance, while displaying untapped
potential to serve as a bridge and integrator of several regions. Iran is also the largest of all countries in
the Middle East by territory, one of the region’s most
populous states (77.5 million; Egypt, 82 million; Turkey, 75 million; and Saudi Arabia, 29 million), and has
one of the region’s largest armed forces and arsenals,
although most of its weaponry is outdated.51 These aspects make it crucial for Washington and its allies to
engage, rather than estrange, Iran.
Despite its enhanced position, Iran is unable to
resolve regional conflicts or advance its geopolitical goals effectively while faced with the formidable
power of the United States and U.S. allies. Wherever it
looks, Tehran confronts Washington in its own neighborhood and is unable to force radical outcomes in
many of the regional conflicts and dynamics. Moreover, some of Iran’s wins are really U.S. geopolitical
mistakes. Both the United States and Iran need each
other to advance their positions, constrained by conflicts and increasingly autonomous policies of their
partners and allies. Washington and Iran could gain
a lot by cooperating to resolve regional wars and conflicts. They would also find it beneficial to cooperate
on counterterrorism activities, which can serve as an
initial trust-building initiative before or after the conclusion of a nuclear deal. Both fight Sunni-inspired and
financed radicalism and terrorism, and neither wants
to have forces deployed along Iran’s eastern and western borders, provided major security concerns are addressed and oil continues to flow unimpeded via the
Strait of Hormuz.52
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The emergence of IS has increased the need for
U.S.-Iranian cooperation in fighting the militant group
in Iraq and Syria. In June 2014 during an IS offensive,
Iran provided Qods Force advisers, drone surveillance, and weapons transfers, as well as helped with
reanimating Shia militias, such as the Promised Day
Brigade, As’aib Ahl Al Haq, Kata’ib Hezbollah, and
the Mahdi Army of Moqtada Al Sadr, to help Iraqi
authorities.53 Iran has also been transferring arms and
ammunition to Iraq and the Peshmerga forces fighting the IS, returned Iraqi combat aircraft to Baghdad
flown to Iran at the start of the 1991 war in Iraq, and
helped the United States with political transition in
Baghdad that involved the appointment of Haider alAbadi as prime minister following a spike in sectarian
violence partially attributed to the preceding administration led by al-Maliki.54
Washington, for its part, authorized airstrikes in
Iraq and Syria and in November 2014 the deployment of additional 1,500 U.S. forces to Iraq, doubling
the number of its troops training Iraqi and Kurdish
forces. It further tasked its Air Combat Command of
the U.S. Air Force to start an 8-year contract in October 2016 to “operate, maintain, and support Air
Force Central Command’s major war reserve materiel facilities in Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, and the UAE.”
The rapid advance by IS on Baghdad prompted U.S.
Secretary of State John Kerry to note that Washington
was “open to discussions [with Iran on Iraq] if there’s
something constructive that can be contributed by
Iran.”55 The United States has already lost more than
4,000 U.S. troops in Iraq since 2003 and, along with
costs of the war in Afghanistan, has spent $U.S.1.8 trillion.56 It cannot afford to lose the fight against old and
new al-Qaedas. Nor can it afford the fight without the
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support of its allies and partners in the conditions of
fiscal austerity, prompting the need to cooperate with
regional payers, including Iran, in fighting the group’s
growing capabilities.
Washington and Tehran further face the rising influence of China and India in the Greater Middle East,
driven by their growing appetites for energy resources and geopolitical clout. While the United States is
interested in advancing a global and regional balance
of power, Iran is keen on diversifying its relations to
balance its burgeoning ties with the two juggernauts,
which are expected to project military assets into the
region to protect their growing economic interests. A
rapprochement would allow Washington and Tehran
to strengthen their positions in respect to the increasingly assertive presence and policies of China and India. Along with the volatile security developments in
the Greater Middle East, the regional trends defined
by the growing presence of China and India—both
dynamic powers capable of challenging regional and
global security orders—make the strategic benefits
of security cooperation between Iran and the United
States particularly obvious. This is especially so given
constraints on the U.S. military in waging a conventional war against Iran or China while engaging in
a global struggle against terrorism and counterinsurgency wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The current
U.S. global engagements and military constraints,
especially as they relate to its ground forces, make it
unrealistic for the United States to contemplate another conflict—hypothetically with Iran—if such a
need arises.57
Washington and Tehran could collaborate in the
framework of Arab-Israeli, Arab-Iranian, and IsraeliIranian conflicts, as well as reconstruction of war-torn
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countries, counterterrorism efforts, and geopolitical
balancing. Such cooperation would have both military
and economic dimensions—a major imperative considering persistent instability in the Greater Middle
East and the lack of development and integration of
the region into the global economic and security networks and institutions. The ideological hostility between Iran and the United States should not conceal
the benefits of geopolitical cooperation or the possibility of normalized relations in the long run. History
provides a reference point: Franklin Roosevelt allied
the United States with Stalinist Russia and Richard
Nixon developed a working partnership with Maoist China. In both cases, an intense ideological rivalry
characterized the relations, but Washington chose accommodation to enhance its interests and avoid the
deadlock.58 Khamenei’s declaration—and later a principle guiding Iran’s foreign policy—that the “revolution was exported once, and that is the end of the
story” gives more room for such a possibility.59
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CHAPTER 3
U.S.-IRANIAN STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP
IN 2030
This will shake the world.
Zhou Enlai to Henry Kissinger in 1972,
upon completing negotiations over the
Shanghai Communique.1

The possibility of P5+1 (the United States, Britain,
France, Russia, and China, plus Germany) and Iran
reaching a nuclear deal and the benefits of a U.S.Iranian strategic détente prompt an assessment of a
U.S.-Iranian strategic relationship in the next 15 years,
regardless of whether Iran “goes nuclear.” This work
has developed three types of a U.S.-Iranian strategic
relationship and dynamics that could emerge by 2030:
1. strategic engagement involving a nuclear weapons-capable Iran;
2. comprehensive cooperation following a “Grand
Bargain”; and,
3. incremental strategic engagement after a
nuclear deal.
The parties get to 1) after Iran stalls for time, improves ties with the United States on a limited level,
and then admits to having a nuclear weapons capability, prompting a more substantive engagement as
the parties seek to maintain strategic stability while
cooperating on other issues of mutual concern. The
sides achieve 2) after they make a “U” turn and reach
a “G” bargain, leading to a comprehensive cooperation between them. They arrive at 3) after concluding
a nuclear deal, reaping the benefits of an incremental
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yet increasingly strategic engagement as they tackle
challenges together and in concert with other actors.
These types of a strategic relationship and related dynamics—while overlapping—deliberately focus on a
constructive U.S.-Iranian engagement regardless of
whether Iran get the “nukes,” skipping a prevalent
discussion on two other possibilities: the status quo,
which would continue to entrench the hostile relationship; and a U.S., Israeli, or U.S.-Israeli strike on
Iran’s nuclear facilities, which would lead to systemic
perturbation in the region.
STRATEGIC ENGAGEMENT ENSUES
AFTER IRAN OBTAINS NUCLEAR
WEAPONS CAPABILITY
In this scenario, despite likely intermittent breaks,
the parties continue their nuclear negotiations, building mutual trust in the geopolitical conditions that
work against the possibility of a costly strike on Iran’s
nuclear facilities. The seemingly successful course of
talks ensures that Washington does not commit itself
to costly and damaging options for dealing with Iran,
saves face, and acclimates its allies to the idea of improving and emerging strategic U.S.-Iranian ties. Tehran effectively stalls for time while continuing nuclear
talks; manages to improve ties with the United States
on a limited level by helping with regional challenges,
including primarily on the counterterrorism front;
and only then admits to having a nuclear weapons
capability.
The revelation of Iran’s nuclear weapons capability—without an explicit U.S.-Iranian or international
deal preventing Iran from obtaining such a capability and without clarity regarding the possession of
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a nuclear weapon by Iran—allows Washington and
Tehran to partially save face and not break their growing relationship. Unlike in the case with North Korea,
Tehran and Washington are prompted to pursue a
substantive engagement, seeking to maintain strategic
stability and to contain proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) in the Greater Middle East.
Specifically, the United States and Iran undertake major efforts to advance regional security cooperation.
However, the lure of WMD is too strong to resist, and
a number of regional actors, including Turkey, Egypt,
and Saudi Arabia, are poised to start or expand their
civil nuclear programs. The diminished U.S. regional
profile and the nuclear status of Iran give them no hope
of protection by Washington or reprieve from fear due
to Iran’s potentially adventurous regional polices. The
United States still maintains a heavy regional military
presence to assuage concerns of its allies, but manages
to diminish it significantly in response to a cooperative stance by Iran, the overall trajectory of improving
relations with Tehran, and a corresponding relaxation
of regional tensions.
While treading cautiously and developing contingency policies, U.S. traditional allies in the Persian
Gulf and Israel begin to undertake a more cooperative approach to Iran. They also seek concrete security
guarantees from the United States and assurances from
China and India to protect them from or hedge against
a potentially emboldened Iran that could launch fullspectrum warfare using conventional, proxy, and
nuclear attacks. The Arab states in the Persian Gulf
leverage their already developing and more constructive ties with Iran, building on their cautious yet increasingly engaged policies toward Tehran following
a reelection of Hassan Rouhani or another moderate
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and given the prospects of a concluded, comprehensive nuclear deal. Dubbed a “one weapon state,”
which assumes its possible annihilation with just one
nuclear weapon due to its small territory, Israel finds
ways to cooperate with a nuclear Iran, drawing on the
legacy of the mutually beneficial ties that had existed
between them before and after the Islamic Revolution.
A new strategic reality in the Middle East emerges,
with potentially positive implications for the resolution or substantial mitigation of the region’s longstanding conflicts, including the Arab-Israeli one.
Both Israel and Iran now have more incentives not
to escalate their positions or force their actions vis-àvis each other or the Arab states, which either seek
or have already obtained security commitments from
the United States. Iran, as part of cooperation with the
United States and for fear of provoking Israel or escalating ongoing interstate tensions, decides to leverage its financial and military influence on Hamas and
Hezbollah in an effort to promote an accord between
Israelis and Palestinians, as well as Israelis and Arabs
as a whole. The Arab states already have more incentive to address their differences, given the enhanced
regional profile of Iran. However, the potential for a
regional arms race, both conventional and nuclear, is
increasing, prompting closer U.S-Iranian engagement
to ensure region-wide strategic stability.
In the economic realm, global oil and regional gas
prices climb up in the short term, given geopolitical
risks stemming from a nuclear weapons-capable Iran.
However, the reduction of regional tensions and expanded energy exports by Iran work to mitigate the
increase in energy prices. Still, the reduction of regional tensions fails to induce a full-fledged economic
cooperation that would otherwise unleash the full po-

40

tential of Iran’s economy. Parties seek to build bridges
with a nuclear weapons-capable Iran in an attempt to
shape its moves, but they choose not to “deep dive”
just yet because of sensitivities about Iran’s nuclear
status and the need to retain leverage on Iran that
increasingly relies on their support to modernize its
economy.
COMPREHENSIVE COOPERATION
FOLLOWS AFTER PARTIES
“U”-TURN AND REACH A “G” BARGAIN
In this scenario, within the next 15 years, the parties conclude a “Grand Bargain,” making a complete
“U” turn from the decades-long hostile and estranged
relations to a friendly and engaged strategic relationship by 2030 that addresses the strategic interests of
the United States and Iran and advances security, stability, and development needs of the Greater Middle
East. The parties have established official ties, and a
normalization of relations is paying big dividends.
Iran is allowed to enrich uranium as part of a nuclear deal but commits not to pursue nuclear weapons capability, while agreeing to a verifiable regime
for its nuclear program. It rescinds support to terrorist groups targeting the United States and U.S. allies;
collaborates with the United States on policies toward
war-torn Iraq; and provides support to Washington
in dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict as well as
civil and proxy wars and security tensions still raging in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Palestine, and Afghanistan. Iran also pledges to work with the United
States in tackling Sunni and Shia-inspired extremism
and militancy in the Greater Middle East. It further
commits to assisting with the reconstruction of Iraq
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and Afghanistan; improves its humans rights record;
opens up its economy to U.S. and Western investments; and works with the United States to advance
the integration of the greater region into the global
economic space.
In return, the United States acknowledges Iran’s
right to pursue nuclear capability for civilian purposes; renounces alleged attempts at regime change;
unfreezes Iranian funds seized following the hostage
crisis; removes crippling sanctions; and assists with
modernizing and integrating the Iranian economy
into the regional and global economy networks. It also
collaborates with Iran on counterterrorism activities;
and stops alleged support to proxies of Saudi Arabia and other countries of the Persian Gulf targeting
Iran’s interests in the Greater Middle East. Finally, it
recognizes Iran’s legitimate security interests and role
as a rising regional power in the greater region, while
significantly downsizing and repurposing its military
posture in the Persian Gulf.
A period of more full-fledged cooperation ensues,
with Iran and the United States successfully and effectively collaborating in the economic sphere. U.S foreign direct investment (FDI) and technology transfers
flow into the badly underperforming and increasingly
prospective Iranian economy. Iran manages to revive
its energy sector and boost its oil and gas exports, benefiting U.S. and Western corporations as well as European countries that can now lessen their dependence
on energy imports from Russia—a perceived geopolitical contender for the United States in Eurasia. Washington and Tehran open up a new vista of collaboration in advancing regional and cross-regional energy,
trade, and transit links spanning East, South, Central,
and West Asia, thereby promoting globalization and
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Iran’s lagging integration into the world economy. In
the process, Iran turns into a regional economic force,
complementing its geopolitical weight. The United
States, in turn, advances its strategy of expanding the
“core” while shrinking the “gap.”
In the security realm, the parties achieve a reduction in regional tensions by addressing Iran’s nuclear
program challenges and start advancing regional security cooperation platforms involving the United
States, Arab countries, Iran, Israel, Turkey, Pakistan,
Russia, China, and India, among others. Washington
and Iran cooperate in bringing stability to Iraq, Syria,
Yemen, Lebanon, and Afghanistan, while collaborating in their increasingly joint struggle against Sunni
militancy in the wider region. They also start engaging Arab and non-Arab powers in confidence-building
arrangements and promoting common economic and
security frameworks advancing development and stability in the Persian Gulf and the Greater Middle East.
Negotiations to address the Palestinian issues and
the Arab-Israeli conflict receive a promising boost, as
parties seek reconciliation following a substantial reduction in regional tensions. The regional parties and
Washington also commence the creation of a WMDfree zone in the region.
INCREMENTAL STRATEGIC
ENGAGEMENT EMERGES
AS SIDES CONTINUE ADVANCING TIES
Under this scenario, Tehran and Washington begin to chart a path to normalization of their relations
by pursuing strategic engagement in incremental
though not always sequential steps, allowing them to
advance from one major track defining a problem to
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the next. A step-by-step quid pro quo generates trust
that builds up and leads to normalization of relations
after 2030. The countries are far from becoming allies,
but common challenges and incremental successes
build enough momentum for a strategic engagement
to emerge on key bilateral and regional issues.
The sides first conclude a nuclear deal, enabling
Tehran to enrich uranium permanently under a verifiable regime in return for lifting of sanctions. A relaxation of regional tensions ensues, despite Iran’s ability
to obtain a “breakout” capacity, prompting the parties
to seize the momentum and pursue a strategic engagement on select issues. As part of the post-nuclear deal
memorandum, the parties publicly issue apologies for
grievances stemming from the Central Intelligence
Agency-backed overthrow of Iranian Prime Minister
Mohammad Mossadeq in 1953 and the 1979 hostage
crisis. The United States discontinues the policy of
regime change and recognizes the Islamic Republic,
prompting Tehran to set up a diplomatic conduit short
of establishing diplomatic ties for fear of creating too
much pressure too soon on the theocratic regime to
adapt or face removal from power.
Washington trades its economic toolkit for Iran’s
geo-economic and geopolitical capabilities. The parties develop a plan to enhance trade relations with the
United States and its allies, committing to technology
transfers, and billions in FDI flows into the Iranian
economy. This helps Iran modernize and diversify
away from its overwhelming dependence on the oil
sector and Asian energy importers. Better performance and more open and diversified economic ties
mitigate prevalent youth unemployment and reduce
poverty, stimulating political liberalization. In return,
Iran agrees to serve as a major interregional link for
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a growing number of trade, energy, and transit corridors being built throughout the Greater Middle
East, contributing to the U.S. policies of integrating
Central-South Asia and the Middle East with the
global economy.
The United States recognizes Iran as a regional
power with legitimate interests and abandons its policy of containment in return for Tehran’s constructive
engagement in addressing regional security challenges. Iran, in time, assists with resolution of conflicts and
reconstruction of Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan. Tehran
ceases military support to Hamas and Hezbollah, pursuing their transformation into demilitarized entities
operating within mainstream politics of Palestine and
Lebanon. It also helps integrate Shia militias into the
fragile political and security order in Iraq, while working to bring a resolution to the still raging conflict in
Syria. This process is not a clear-cut trade, but a phased
approach enabling the parties to verify each other’s
intensions and build trust as they gradually elevate
their strategic relationship from one track to another.
The United States, Iran, Turkey, Iraq, and the Arab
states pursue regional security cooperation, advancing secure passage of energy resources through the
Persian Gulf, a WMD-free zone, and normalization of
ties involving Israel, Iran, and the Arab states. Increasingly, the parties appreciate Iran’s contribution to regional security and development, while Iran moderates its tense stance toward neighbors and engages
in cooperative practices that advance confidence in
its constructive role as a major regional power. The
constructive engagement by Iran mitigates security
concerns emanating from Tel-Aviv and Arab capitals
about Iran’s growing regional profile and improving
ties between Tehran and Washington, creating conditions for the re-establishment of diplomatic ties be45

tween the United States and Iran, as well as Tel-Aviv
and Tehran, in the next few years. Iran’s theocratic
regime remains in place, but moderate forces gain increasing influence across administrations and prepare
the groundwork for Iran’s political transformation
from a Sharia-based system to a secular political order
beyond 2030.
THE THREE ALTERNATIVE FUTURES—
LIKELIHOOD AND PLAUSIBILITY
ASSESSMENT
Strategic Engagement Ensues after Iran Obtains
Nuclear Weapons Capability.
This scenario and related outcomes are premised
on Iran’s interest in acquiring nuclear weapons capability at all costs. This is not a far-fetched proposition,
considering the history of concealed nuclear facilities
in Iran, Tehran’s defiance of United Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions, and its lack of cooperation
with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
The survival of the theocratic regime, perceived threats
from Israel, and invasions of and proxy wars for new
regimes in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya, among others, enhance for Iran the appeal of nuclear weapons
and related deterrence capabilities. Getting its hands
on the “nukes” would make Iran part of the club of
nuclear powers and help it advance its regional political and military influence while raising its prestige
as the first Shia Muslim country to possess nuclear
weapons in the region alongside Israel and Pakistan.2
Iran also perceives the development of nuclear weapons as a “shortcut” to get to a “desired modernity” by
demonstrating its scientific capacity and advancement
to the world and major powers.3
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In this light, Israel worries that “the charm offensive” by the Rouhani administration could drive
a wedge among the P5+1 members, undermine the
impact and intent of international sanctions, and lead
to a deal that brings Iran closer to nuclear breakout
capacity. Hence, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s portrayal of the “interim” deal as a “historical mistake,” not a “historic agreement,”4 or his
characterization of failure by the parties to reach an
agreement by November 25, 2014, as “no deal is better than a bad deal.” This scenario assumes that Israel
and the United States would allow Tehran to drag
nuclear talks on for the next 15 years. Iran may well
manage to play a “one step forward, two steps back”
game in the talks. Iran can also build confidence and
rapport with Washington in the meantime by helping
it address regional security issues before an ultimate
nuclear deal is reached, stalling for time as it works to
get its grip on the “nukes.” Meanwhile, a normalization of trade relations and integration of Iran into the
global economy could remove the current focus on its
nuclear program, enabling Tehran to obtain nuclear
weapons capability with less resistance from major actors and the international community. This could be
part of the current strategy by Tehran, which seeks to
exhaust external parties and discourage them from applying similar pressures a repeated number of times.5
Some argue that the United States, Israel, and their
partners simply have no viable options preventing
Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons capability, placing a higher premium on accommodation and relaxation of tensions with Iran. The U.S. regional power
is more likely to decline further down rather than
climb back up—exactly the reason for strategic engagement with a nuclear Iran. In March 2013, Ameri-
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can President Barack Obama indicated, referring to
the U.S. intelligence community, “it would take Iran
over a year or so to develop a nuclear weapon.”6
Skeptics dismiss the view about the lack of options
for dealing with Iran, alleging that the “lack of options” argument provides justification for acceptance
of a nuclear Iran. This, they argue, could breed what
is dreaded—a nuclear Iran run by Mullahs keen on
spreading their fervent Islamic revolution across
borders.
The scenario also assumes that Israel and the United States would accept a nuclear weapons-capable
Iran and its potential adventurism in foreign policy
throughout the region after the revelation of Iran’s
nuclear capability and would not resort to the use of
force to stop Tehran from fielding a nuclear weapon
or producing more of them in the future. Put differently, they would not “strike while the iron is hot”
or “take the bull by the horns” while they still could.
Both sides drew their “red lines,” with Israel pledging
not to allow even a nuclear weapons-capable Iran and
the United States promising to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.7 In a way, this line of thinking is similar to the “red line” drawn by Washington
for Assad’s use of chemical weapons, only much more
difficult to defend when it is Iran crossing it, even
if it may not have the weapon yet. The revelation of
Assad’s WMD use and Washington’s hesitation to enforce the “red line” in response speaks of diminished
U.S. capacity to intervene forcefully. At the same time,
one should not discount a possibility that Israel and/
or the United States may be tempted to strike a nuclear Iran, assuming that Iran’s nuclear capabilities are
still limited.8
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As far as Iran’s possible adventurism, the record of
nuclear proliferation does not lend credibility to the
argument that nuclear weapons “facilitate regional
bullying or adventurism.”9 Though not a guarantee,
the possession of nuclear weapons could make its
owner more cautionary and less escalatory, though
it would certainly limit policy options of other actors in the region. For instance, a hypothetical Iranian
declaration equating an attack on Hezbollah as an attack on Iran would certainly constrain Israeli’s range
of responses.10 Kenneth Waltz’ argument that Iran’s
nuclear weapons could be a factor of strategic stability
in the Middle East11 deserves a careful review, not as a
prescription for helping Iran get the nuclear bomb but
as a means to deal with a geopolitically complex aftermath. Of course, one should admit that neither Iran,
nor Israel would operate in a “stable [Mutually Assured Destruction] environment” because neither of
them could have a “secure, second-strike capability,”
prompting a dangerous possibility of what Thomas
Schelling describes as “reciprocal fear of surprise attack.”12 Nevertheless, the existence of “two nuclear
states plus regional stability” may be a better outcome
than “two nuclear states with regional upheaval,” not
to mention nuclear proliferation risks inherent in either outcome.13 Finally, regional and other countries
would more likely welcome a nuclear Iran that is open,
secular, more democratic, and engaged with the West
and others, rather than a nuclear Iran with opposite
attributes.14
Another assumption of the scenario is that Iran
and the United States get to start improving their relationship without addressing Iran’s nuclear program
issues adequately. This is not impossible but difficult
to imagine, given potential accusations of defeat that
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opponents in both countries could level on respective
administrations. Valid as it may be, one should also
consider the history of U.S.-Iranian cooperation during the Contra Affair in the 1980s and in Afghanistan
shortly after September 11, 2001—in addition to conceivable wild card scenarios—that provides a precedent and reveals a potential for improvement in ties
without the parties concluding a nuclear deal first. A
relaxation of tensions following a conclusion of the
deal could, however, lead to an even more substantive
and productive strategic engagement, and in relatively shorter timeframes. This would not only extend to
the bilateral relations as they concern the Greater Middle East but also Latin America, where Iran has been
enhancing its presence (As Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
once quipped, “When the Western countries were trying to isolate Iran, we went to the U.S. backyard.”15)
The scenario’s major vulnerability stems from the
idea that the new reality of a nuclear-weapons capable
Iran invites more cooperation, even strategic engagement, from Washington. This is not an invalid observation, considering the case of severed U.S.-North
Korean ties, especially after Pyongyang went nuclear
in the 2000s. However, major differences work in favor of an increasingly strategic engagement with a
nuclear-weapons capable Iran. The United States and
Iran have not fought a prolonged conventional war on
Iranian or other territory and are not deadlocked in an
armistice. Nuclear China and Russia—both bordering
North Korea and having massive conventional forces
and arsenals—provide some measure of containment and counterbalance to North Korea. A nuclear
weapons-capable Iran would find itself in the region
with a nuclear Pakistan and Israel that possess about
100 and 200 nuclear bombs each. Not least important
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is the overall complexity and the conflict potential in
the Greater Middle East—the area I dub the “region
of wars.” There is just too much at stake in this region
for the United States to distance itself from a nuclear
weapons-capable Iran that can create solutions as well
as problems (depending on the approach the United
States chooses to pursue under the circumstances).
Moreover, the United States has found a way to cooperate with a nuclear Pakistan and India.
Finally, the scenario assumes that the Arab states,
Turkey, and Israel would accept the status quo, begin
to gradually improve ties with Iran, and would refrain
from pursuing their own nuclear capability. On the
one hand, this is a valid possibility, assuming that the
United States brings in all the parties into common security frameworks and extends its more explicit protection to the Arab states and Israel (Turkey is already
a North Atlantic Treaty Organization ally). The Arab
states and Israel could also draw on their legacies of
cooperation with Iran before the Islamic Revolution,
after the revolution, and even more recently in the case
of the Arab states and Iran.16 On the other hand, tensions between the Sunnis and Shia are running high,
Saudi Arabia is poised to contest Iran’s growing capabilities, and Israel’s fear of a nuclear Iran is too strong
for cooperative steps to emerge. But there is a third
possibility: A nuclear Iran could actually stimulate cooperation between all concerned parties for purposes
of maintaining strategic stability in the greater region.
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Comprehensive Cooperation Follows after Parties’
“U”-Turn and Reach a “G” Bargain.
This scenario assumes that the parties manage to
reconcile many of their grievances after more than 3
decades of their estranged and hostile relationship. It
ignores the record of repeatedly failed negotiations;
bureaucratic inertia; and opposition within Iran, the
United States, Israel, and the Arab states to a deal allowing Iran to permanently enrich uranium (thereby
allowing it to get to the breakout capacity) leading to
full-fledged U.S.-Iranian cooperation. While weighty,
this line of thinking disregards the systemic forces
reviewed in Chapter 1, strategic interests shared by
Tehran and Washington pushing them to achieve the
“Grand Bargain,” and opportunity costs of failing to
conclude such a high-payoff deal. The “Grand Bargain” is grand not only due to its historic and geopolitical significance. It is also grand because of its quid
pro quo elements that ultimately constitute and are
shaped by those very systemic forces that are capable
of simultaneously supporting and challenging the regional order. In other words, the system itself needs
the “Grand Bargain” to save itself from implosion.
Holding keys of a systemic change in the region, Iran
and the United States can make it happen. Both share
a number of common interests, threats, and opportunities that are calling for the grand deal.
Skeptics further point to numerous difficulties of
pursuing such a complex undertaking resting on a
multitude of diverse and controversial issues, which
are of fundamental importance to the parties involved.
They have a point. Just resolving the nuclear side
of the deal is a mind-boggling exercise that may yet
undercut the desirability and anticipated practicality
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of an incremental approach to the nuclear talks and
construction of a U.S.-Iranian strategic relationship.
But years of negotiation failures have convinced opponents that pursuing and getting to the “G” bargain
is not a senseless idea. The policy of coercion and isolation of Iran largely has failed over the last 3 decades,
while no “U” turn in the relations should be expected
without a deal involving a big leap rather than small
steps. First, a decision to pursue the “G” bargain would
not damage the U.S. position. Second, the parties can
avoid minor setbacks that are a feature of incremental approaches and could derail the entire trajectory
of talks and force parties to start over. Third, they
can ensure higher pay-offs in shorter timeframes.17
A “G” bargain caters to Iran’s view of itself as a major
player with legitimate security interests, which is capable of making “grand” deals with a “great” power
based on mutual respect and common interests. After all, Iran was a, if not the, major protector of the
Persian Gulf states prior to the Islamic Revolution—a
role it ceded to Iraq and the United States and now
wants to reclaim by leveraging its rising profile.18 It
also views its security through the prism of foreign invasions—7 in the last 200 years, to be precise—which
brought humiliation and left a lasting mark on the
Iranian psyche.19
Proponents of the “Grand Bargain” scenario also
highlight historical precedents, including the ones involving Iran itself, which demonstrate the futility of
the incremental approach and the need for “Grand”
thinking. They cite Richard Nixon’s decision to “put
aside all the issues which constituted the existing SinoAmerican dialogue” and focus on “the broader issue
of China’s attitude toward dialogue with the United
States”—a move that allegedly led to the Shanghai
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Communiqué in 1972 and improvement of the relationship between the two states.20 They further cite
Iran’s cooperation with the George H. W. Bush administration on the hostage crisis in Lebanon, with the Bill
Clinton administration on arms shipments to Bosnia,
and with the George W. Bush administration on the
invasion of Afghanistan—all of which could have, but
failed to induce a détente between the United States
and Iran.21 Tehran further pursued comprehensive negotiations with Washington starting with the second
term of the Khatami administration.22 But the lack of
meaningful engagement by the United States led to a
weakened position of moderates within the Iranian
administrations, which culminated in the comeback
to power of the Principalists in the face of Ahmadinejad as president, who leveraged the country’s growing
revenues from record-high oil prices to challenge the
U.S. position throughout the greater region.23
Tehran went even further, reaching out to Washington in search of a “Grand Bargain” in 2003, offering to end support to Palestinian terrorist groups;
encourage disarmament of Hezbollah; assist with
counterterrorism; accept a Saudi plan on Arab-Israeli
peace; work with Washington to advance political
and economic stability in Iraq; and open its nuclear
program to intrusive inspections. In return, it asked
the United States to recognize the legitimacy of the
Islamic Republic and its security concerns; stop the
regime-change rhetoric; lift all sanctions; support Tehran’s efforts to obtain war reparations related to the
Iran-Iraq War; assist with apprehension of members
of an Iranian expatriate terrorist group; and respect
its right to access chemical, biological, and nuclear
technology. Israel would need to withdraw from all
occupied territories, accept an independent state of
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Palestine, and agree to equal sharing of Jerusalem and
a fair resolution of the Palestinian refugee issue. The
expectation was that it would lead to normalization
of ties between Iran and Israel and the successful implementation of the two-state solution.24 But the Bush
administration rejected the deal because it legitimized
the Iranian regime25 and because the United States was
in the position of relative strength after it toppled the
Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in Iraq
on Iran’s eastern and western flanks.
Now that Iran has traded places with the United
States, would it pursue a “G” deal with Washington,
whose regional geopolitical clout has been dissipating? On the one hand—“no,” because a relatively
stronger Iran may not favor the deal altogether, let
alone a sub-optimal one. Iran is already experienced
in facing regional security threats in the conditions
of isolation and sanctions, which suggests that a rapprochement may not be viewed in Tehran as an absolute necessity.26 On the other hand—“yes,” because
Iran’s stronger bargaining power can allow it to get a
better optimal deal. What is clear is that motivations
to engage in talks are not always easily defined, leaving plenty of room for “yes,” “no,” and “it depends”
options. Furthermore, Iran is known to have reached
a détente with both Britain and Saudi Arabia, despite
deep antipathy by Khamenei’s regime to Riyadh and a
“conspiratorial” sentiment toward London.27
The likelihood of the U.S.-Iranian strategic relationship emerging rests on the “G” deal’s perceived
power to transform interstate ties. But would it generate sufficient and necessary momentum for relaxation
of tensions across a wide spectrum of complicated
regional conflicts and agents? After all, the pursuit
of regional security cooperation mechanisms is un-
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likely to eliminate lingering and legitimate geopolitical concerns of the United States, its allies, and Iran
itself. Nor is it likely to ensure the end of proxy wars
or militant attacks coordinated by regional state entities dissatisfied with the “G” bargain. Finally, the
scenario assumes that all, and I mean all, are onboard
with the deal, even if Washington and Tehran go it
alone in spearheading fundamental changes that the
bargain entails. Of course, some could counter that
there is “no historically determined enmity between
Arabs and Iranians” and thus find accommodation
following the conclusion of the “G” Bargain an easy
undertaking, citing Iran’s expanding ties with Iraq following the removal of Saddam, for instance.28 But this
ignores conquests of Persian domains by Arabs and
religious and civilizational differences, not to mention
geopolitical circumstances and dynamics that have
long generated hostility between Iranians and Arabs.
A good question, then, is whether a strategic relationship based on comprehensive U.S.-Iranian cooperation is an illusion. As some argue, Iran does not
want a unified Iraq and seeks regional domination. It
cannot provide guarantees of abandoning its alleged
nuclear weapons program. Iran also needs the conflict
with the United States to ensure its regime survival.29
A far-reaching bargain seems impossible on ideological, political, and economic grounds, as the Iranian
regime was founded on revolutionary zeal and antiAmericanism.30 Accepting engagement with the United States for some Iranian Principalists is equivalent
to aligning Iran’s policies, if not subordinating them,
with those of Washington, Tel Aviv, and Riyadh to the
detriment of Iran’s autonomous regional position and
its role as a defender of Muslim causes.31
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Of course, miracles are unlikely to occur overnight:
This was true of the U.S. détente with China and the
Soviet Union and would be true in the case of a U.S.
détente with Iran. The transformation of interstate ties
is not the “G” Bargain’s stipulation but an implication
requiring time and direction to unfold. Moreover, the
parties could increase the chances of such a bargain if
they viewed normalization of their ties as a statecraft
tool rather than a post-deal award.32
Incremental Strategic Engagement Emerges
as Sides Continue Advancing Ties.
Unlike the first scenario, Iran gets to enrich uranium permanently under a verifiable regime but does
not obtain or admit to having a nuclear-weapons capability. Unlike the second scenario, Tehran gets the
nuclear deal done in order to advance normalization
of ties in the long run, but does not seek a “G” Bargain
due to its relatively stronger geopolitical position and
desire to first enhance confidence in mutual relations
by pursuing incremental steps in cooperation with the
United States on select issues. This scenario is in between the two “extremes” and may have better prospects at materializing, though it is not without a set of
its own weak and strong points.
The strategic relationship presumed under this scenario shares similarities with a “select engagement”
partnership concept articulated in “Iran: The Time
for a New Approach” report by an Independent Task
Force, chaired by Zbigniew Brzezinski and Robert
Gates. The report authors called for the United States
to reassess its policy of nonengagement, highlighting areas in which the United States and Iran could
undertake their selective engagement on converging
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interests and build on incremental progress to address the broader range of issues. However, the report also provides dissenting views that cast doubt on
the likely relative success of the incremental engagement in improving the general relationship between
Washington and Tehran, citing failure of such approach over the last 3 decades and the need for a more
comprehensive deal.33
Others have voiced similar ideas or assessed U.S.Iranian engagement from the perspective of different
negotiating strategies meant to satisfy the parties’
interests. Former U.S. ambassador to Iraq and Afghanistan Ryan Crocker; Director of the Iran Project at
Columbia University William Luers; and former U.S.
Undersecretary of State Thomas Pickering have called
for a strategic U.S.-Iranian partnership, emphasizing
that “mutually informed parallel action is essential.”34
Seyyed Hossein Mousavian, a former Iranian diplomat and author, in turn, has recommended a phased
approach by first addressing the nuclear issue, followed by issues related to terrorism, human rights,
Iraq, Syria, and energy, among others. Lynn Davis, in
her RAND study, highlights the need for “caution”
and “hedging” to foster and harness a change in Iranian policies.35 Meanwhile, Christine Parthemore and
James Miller point to the need for a game-changing
diplomacy with Iran that would require “de-emphasizing near-term threats of military action, giving first
priority to getting comprehensive verification in place
for Iran’s nuclear program, and negotiating directly
with Iran on a broad range of issues”36 thereafter.
Such approaches and envisioned relationships
presume that the parties proceed cautiously in view of
domestic politics and that they build trust gradually,
in part to mitigate concerns of anxious allies about
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prospects of improved ties between the United States
and Iran. To flip a term often attributed to President
Ronald Reagan, the parties first need to “verify, then
build trust.”37 The incremental approach focuses more
on timing, issues, and building trust rather than just issues. It appears more possible in the circumstances of
severed diplomatic ties because the parties need time
to cultivate trust first through phased cooperation. In
contrast, parties that recognize one another and maintain diplomatic ties have more room to encourage
faster, more comprehensive, and simultaneous work
on all concerned tracks. The incremental approach to
strategic engagement in this scenario makes the process lengthier, slowing down the momentum toward a
full-fledged strategic relationship because of potential
setbacks that can occur with each new administration.
However, it does not presuppose the impossibility of
pursuing a resolution and/or collaboration on several
separate tracks simultaneously; it merely makes it less
likely while emphasizing gradualism and trust-building as parties move along the spectrum of normalization from one issue to the next in a more or less phased
manner. After all, building trust and endowing interests-based agreements with trust makes them much
more likely to be accepted as binding, effective, and
productive in spurring a substantial cooperation.38
The scenario further assumes that Israel chooses
or is forced not to launch an attack on Iran, despite
its declared policy of preventing a nuclear-weaponscapable Iran at all cost. As part of the concluded
nuclear deal, Iran can enrich uranium permanently
under specific caps preventing Tehran from getting a
break-out capacity. But Israel is unlikely to trust Iran,
even with the IAEA’s safeguards in place, given the
revelation of secret nuclear facilities in Iran in the past.
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However, the conclusion of a nuclear deal would lead
to reduction in regional tensions. Israel’s diplomatic
maneuvers to convince the international community
about the practicality, necessity, or desirability of an
attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities would be more constrained, especially given serious limits on Israeli and
U.S. capabilities to strike and destroy or set back Iran’s
nuclear program.39 The position of the United States,
too, would work against such a possibility.
The scenario also assumes that Iran is desperate
for economic support and would reciprocate using
its economic capacity as an energy power and transit
link and its geopolitical capacity as a regional power.
Iran’s economy is outdated and underutilizing its potential, but whatever gains it has made seem to have
been sufficient over the last 3 decades to continue on
an isolationist course. What made a partial difference in inducing the ongoing talks, however, were
the crippling sanctions on Iran’s oil sector and the
fact that Russia and China, among others, joined in.
The badly performing economy and anti-government
protests against electoral fraud in 2009 encouraged
the Iranian regime to relax its grip, made possible by
the new administration headed by Rouhani, who declared a new course toward a resolution of the nuclear
program issues.
But this line of thinking rests on the argument that
the Islamic regime does not fear the prospect of political liberalization and popular pressures for political
and economic reform following the conclusion of a
nuclear deal, economic opening, and U.S. recognition
of Iran—the issues making the idea of Iran’s integration into the global economy a double-edged sword.
After all, it is anti-Americanism that keeps the regime
in power in Tehran. Yet, the Iranian theocratic system
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is very unpopular among Iranian citizens; the Iranian
public has a more favorable opinion of the United
States than societies in many countries in the Middle
East; and popular pressure for reform in Iran is growing, considering prevalent unemployment and high
inflation40—a dynamic not lost on domestic politics in
Iran with the coming of a moderate administration.
That said, Iran has “multiple centers of authority and
constant power struggles,” and its system has proven
“remarkably resilient to wars, economic crises, and
intense domestic rivalries.”41
The incremental engagement envisioned in this
scenario also makes the desired transition to a more
liberal political and economic order in Iran a more
smooth and, thus, more accepted and likely outcome.42 The history of ongoing struggles for democracy in Iran—thwarted by domestic and external forces
over the last 100 years—highlights that possibility
(the Constitutional revolution in 1906; the Mossaddeq
rebellion; the Islamic Revolution which the populace
initially perceived as a quest for more democratic rule;
and a series of reformist administrations).43
However, it is unclear if Iran wants to be part of
America’s project of advancing globalization. Iran
may also lose support with Muslims worldwide by collaborating with Washington on controversial issues.
Meanwhile, opponents of the incremental strategic
engagement could play the role of spoilers, preventing
Iran and the United States from pursuing the disarmament of Hamas and Hezbollah, or reconstruction in
Iraq and Afghanistan, among other goals. To mitigate
this prospect, Iran and the United States could position themselves as bridges between the West and the
East, the Christian and the Muslim civilizations, the
developed and developing worlds working together
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on what are increasingly common challenges in the
age of globalization.
Regardless of the ultimate shape of a U.S.-Iranian
strategic relationship, it would mark a dramatic reversal of the currently hostile relationship—a shift for
which Washington, Tehran, and their allies should
prepare now. The proposed policies do exactly that,
assuming the United States desires a strategic relationship with Iran to reverse its decline and attain a
“strategic recovery.”44
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CHAPTER 4
CULTIVATING AND PREPARING FOR
STRATEGIC CHANGE
Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory.
Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat.
Chinese proverb
(apocryphally attributed to Sun Tzu).1

STEERING RELATIONSHIPS WITH
KEY PLAYERS
Besides seeking to mend ties with Iran, the United
States would need to steer its relationships with major
actors to prepare for a strategic shift that its détente
with Iran would entail, regardless of whether Iran
“goes nuclear.” Doing so would more effectively ensure U.S. national interests and prepare its allies and
partners for this shift and the ensuing strategic change.
Washington would need to highlight related strategic
benefits for its allies and for the regional stability. In
the process, the focus should be on steering, not pushing, as well as on guiding, not dragging, its partners.
This is critical because:
a. The United States cannot impose outcomes as effectively as it could have a decade or more ago, given
its diminished global and regional influence;
b. Iran itself should be encouraged to open up and
do more to gain trust of U.S. partners and allies;
c. The United States should not create an impression or a reality of abandoning its partners; and,
d. Washington needs to ensure that there are as
few spoilers of the anticipated shift as possible.
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Pursuing the nuclear talks in the framework of
P5+1 (the United States, Britain, France, Russia, and
China, plus Germany) is important because it allows
fostering common decisions and outcomes that reflect the positions of several U.S. partners, gradually
softening them to the idea of a U.S.-Iranian engagement that may turn into a strategic relationship in the
long term. Washington would find it easier to work
with European allies that are members of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). These countries share extensive interests with the United States,
have concerns about their energy security, and possess economic tools to help Iran revive its economy.
After the conclusion of a nuclear deal and removal of
sanctions, Washington should work with them closely
to ensure substantial foreign direct investment (FDI)
and technology transfers to Iran in return for constructive steps by Tehran toward normalizing its ties
with Washington and European capitals in various
spheres. The deal should be very sweet and difficult to
resist for Iran, which needs massive investments and
technological infusions to revive its underperforming
oil sector and the overall economy.2
Steering U.S. ties with Russia, China, and India
would be more difficult but no less important, given
the need to mitigate potential obstacles to U.S.-Iranian engagement by Moscow, Beijing, and New Delhi.
Russia is not interested in having a nuclear Iran at its
doorstep and would prefer being able to shape regional outcomes if Iran were to “go nuclear.” It has positioned itself as an intermediary in the nuclear dispute,
seeking to reap “the benefits of selective cooperation”
with both the United States and Iran.3 Moscow’s ties
with Tehran worsened after the discovery of an enrichment facility near Qom and Russia’s support to
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the United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution
1929, which banned the sale of its advanced S-300 surface-to-air missile system to Iran.4 However, Russia
helped Iran complete a nuclear power plant in Bushehr in 2012 that requires Iran to return all spent fuel
rods to Russia; agreed in 2014 to build two new nuclear power reactors in Iran and potentially six more
thereafter, with the oversight of construction and fuel
handling provided by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)5; remains Tehran’s major weapons
supplier, accounting for 16 percent of Iranian arms imports in 2011.6 Russia and Iran further support Assad
in Syria, where Russia maintains its only refueling station in the Mediterranean region and where Iran finds
its only state ally.7
But Russia is also a major oil and gas exporter and
a competitor to the energy-rich Iran. A U.S.-Iranian
strategic rapprochement would enable the European
Union (EU) and Iran to explore options of delivering
substantially more energy exports to the EU, Central
Asia, and Southeast Asia, primarily to China and India, undermining Moscow’s leverage on these regions
and countries. More expanded exports by Iran could
well cause a drop in global oil and regional gas prices,
undercutting energy revenues on which Kremlin strategists rely to maintain their power, while encouraging
Russia to diversify and modernize its own economy.
Washington would need to work with both “siloviki”
and “civiloki” to advance a vision of a modern Russia, which is not hostage to its resource exports-based
economy but is a globally competitive player. In this
context, and to prevent a Russia being caught off
guard, Washington should help Moscow develop other sectors of the Russian economy with FDI and technology inflows from the West. This would help Russia
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liberalize economically and politically, while preparing it to face an increasingly active Iran that is keen on
expanding its energy exports. Washington should also
encourage Russia to enhance its economic presence
in Iran to mitigate Tehran’s dependence on China,
sending a signal that Russia would remain a part of
the strategic change in the region. Finally, it should
continue to leverage its missile defense plans in Europe to elicit Russia’s cooperation in facilitating both
the nuclear talks and a future U.S.-Iranian strategic
engagement.
China is a major player on Iran-related issues ranging from proliferation and sanctions, arms sales, energy resource development, to trade and investments.
Beijing has not lent strong support either to the United
States or Iran in the nuclear dispute, “supporting nuclear/arms sanctions on Iran diplomatically and flouting them in practice.” China is Iran’s largest trading
partner (planning to boost trade to at least $100 billion
by 2016 from the current $30-40 billion) and a major
arms supplier (it had provided Tehran with large
arms shipments—including HY-2 Silkworm anti-ship
missiles—by the 6th year of the Iran-Iraq War in 198088). China had supplied missile-related technologies
to Iran, forcing Washington to impose sanctions on
Beijing from 2001-10. It is also Iran’s largest oil importer, importing 85 percent (worth $U.S.39 billion) of
all Iranian oil exports in the first 10 months of 2011
(though its imported oil from Iran in 2011 represented
11 percent of all oil imports). Beijing is one of a few
major players assisting Iran with modernizing its energy sector and exploiting Iran’s underdeveloped and
new oil and gas fields.8
China views Iran as a platform against alleged U.S.
domination attempts, seeking to enhance its regional
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influence while “pinning down” the U.S. military in
the Gulf to make it more challenging for the United
States to implement its declared pivot to the Pacific to
face a rising China. As a prominent Chinese foreign
policy analyst Wang Jisi, Dean of the Peking University School of International Studies, commented on
the U.S. war effort in Iraq: “It is beneficial for our external environment to have the United States militarily and diplomatically deeply sunk in the Mideast to
the extent that it can hardly extricate itself.”9 Mending ties with Iran is a key to the U.S. extrication, while
working with China could help Washington to foster
improvement in the U.S.-Iranian relationship. U.S. efforts to induce cooperation from China would involve
accepting a greater yet constructive role of China in
global affairs; U.S. cooperation on cross-Strait issues;
U.S. support for China in accessing high technology
from the United States;10 and proposals for sharing the
burden of protecting energy flows increasingly bound
for East Asia.
While India is not a member of P5+1, its status as
a nuclear power, economic dynamism, and growing
geo-economic partnership with Iran makes New Delhi
a critical actor in influencing the evolution of Iran over
the next decade. India has the largest population of
Shias after Iran; faces similar geopolitical concerns regarding the role of Pakistan in Afghanistan and the
wider region; and has concerns about stability in Central Asia. It is a major energy importer and a growing
trade partner for Iran, which offers the main trade corridor for India to Central Asia given Pakistan’s reluctance to allow expanded trade across its territory into
Central Asia. New Delhi is keen on cooperating with
Iran in developing Iran’s port at Chabahar that would
facilitate a trade and transit connection between In-
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dia, one the one hand, and Afghanistan and Central
Asia, on the other, bypassing the need for India to rely
on Pakistan to access those markets. India is also concerned that Iran is turning into a strategic partner for
China—Iran’s main arms exporter and energy importer.11 India has agreed—under strong pressure—to cut
oil imports from Iran after the imposition of sanctions
in 2012, but has drastically boosted energy and other
cooperation with Iran following the conclusion of the
“interim nuclear deal” in November 2013. The United
States should work with New Delhi to advance interregional infrastructure initiatives involving Iran, not
least due to India’s growing profile in Central Asia
and Afghanistan, as well.
China and India are major importers of Iranian energy resources, and their share is only bound to grow
with the removal of all sanctions on Iran, translating
into more geopolitical leverage for Beijing and New
Delhi in the Greater Middle East. China’s and India’s
growing regional economic presence is critical for the
development of the region and the U.S. strategy of
shrinking the “gap,” but Washington should keep in
mind the geopolitical mass that their economic presence is generating and how China and India could
leverage it to the detriment or benefit of U.S. policies
in the region, especially in light of anticipated military expansion of these actors in the Persian Gulf and
the Greater Middle East.12 In this context, the United
States would do well to enlist the support of its Western partners in helping Iran diversify its economy
away from its overwhelming reliance on China, India,
and other actors in South-East Asia, while enhancing
their own geopolitical presence. By 2013, Iran’s trade
with Asia counted for 83 percent of its overall trade,
while its trade turnover with China represented 50
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percent of its overall trade.13 Washington should also
start working with China and India on developing
regional security mechanisms and, with time, joint
or rotational patrolling of the Persian Gulf and other
sea arteries through which energy exports, including those of Iran, flow to global markets. It is critical
that Washington navigates its relationship with China
and India by institutionalizing it, given implications
of more dynamic and strategic ties involving Tehran,
Beijing, and New Delhi following a nuclear deal.
But steering ties with Israel and Saudi Arabia,
among other Arab Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
states, would require a lot of finesses on the part of
Washington. Skeptics fear that neither Saudi Arabia,
nor Israel is likely to significantly alter their policies
vis-à-vis Iran after the conclusion of a nuclear deal,
let alone a possible détente between Tehran and
Washington. Washington should pursue regular and
high-level strategic dialogues with and among all the
concerned parties on broader regional security and
strategic issues in order to mitigate any adverse implications from the deal.14 It should also continue policies
emphasizing “prevention and preparation” vis-à-vis
both Iran and Israel: discouraging Iran from obtaining
nuclear weapons and being ready to deter should it
“go nuclear,” while discouraging Israel from launching an attack on Iran and strengthening its capabilities
in an effort to prepare it for a new strategic reality in
the region. In the process, the United States should encourage intelligence sharing with Israel and communication between Israeli and Iranian security experts
and officials on deterrence and cooperation issues.15
Washington has levers to encourage Israel to
support U.S. positions and policies regarding a U.S.Iranian détente provided this rapprochement assures
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Israel’s core security interests and involves Iran as a
friendlier power. Washington is Israel’s major arms
supplier, providing it with $U.S.3 billion in military
aid annually. Both share extensive technological, economic, and strategic ties. The United States should
consider extending its security commitments to Israel
but in a way that allows Israel sufficient autonomy in
addition to enhanced protection so as not to undermine Israel’s own deterrence while enabling its freedom of action as needed.16 In parallel, Washington
should encourage Tel-Aviv to play a constructive role
in resolving regional conflicts, which would ease regional tensions and allow Israel to gradually improve
ties with Iran, especially given Tel Aviv’s history of
cooperation with Iran and their only recent strategic
competition (both started to view one another as very
strong rivals only in the last decade.17)
In the case of Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia, the United States would do well to reinforce its
security commitments but without expanding its military posture after a nuclear deal, as it seeks to reduce
its military presence due to gradually improving ties
with Iran and the need to pivot to the Pacific to face assertive China. It should also encourage economic and
security ties between Iran and the Arab states because
resolving the region’s conflicts depends on cooperative policies between major Sunni and Shia supporters. Iran and Saudi Arabia, among other Arab states,
have already started to work more closely, given Tehran’s growing regional profile and diminishing U.S.
influence in the region. Washington should encourage
their cooperation, ideally as part of institutionalized
processes, regimes, and mechanisms, in order to build
upon this institutional framework of cooperation
when the time comes for a U.S.-Iranian détente.
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As it steers its partners, Washington should not
lose sight of the need to restore a balance of power in
the region. The weakened Iraq is no longer offering
that opportunity, but there is a country that does—
Turkey. A NATO ally with the largest army in the
Middle East and population approximating Iran’s,
Turkey has emerged over the last decade as one of the
world’s most dynamic economies, recently becoming
the world’s 15th largest. Its economic prowess has enabled it to play an increasingly assertive role in the
extended neighborhood, boosting its economic presence and political sway, including in Iran with which
it shares strong energy and trade ties. It was Turkey
that, along with Brazil, had brokered a nuclear swap
deal with Iran in June 2010 as part of the Tehran Declaration, noting Tehran’s right to enrich uranium for
peaceful purposes and stipulating that Tehran would
ship 1,200 kilograms of low-enriched uranium to Turkey within 1 month. Washington rejected the deal
because it failed to prevent Iran’s breakout capacity, arranging for multilateral sanctions against Iran
rather than embracing the role of Brazil and Turkey in
institutionalizing positive dynamics involving Iran’s
nuclear program. The U.S. action damaged its ties
with Turkey and Brazil, both of which voted against
the sanctions on Iran.18
Unlike Saudi Arabia, Turkey is politically vibrant,
economically dynamic, and militarily more competent. Unlike Iran, Turkey brings a “liberal” Islam that
is not revolutionary or conservative and embraces
modernism.19 Like Iran, Turkey has strengthened its
role as a Muslim voice and has seen the center of gravity shift from the Arab core to the non-Arab periphery.
It did so by opposing the war in Iraq and championing
the rights of Palestinians and Muslims throughout the
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region during the Arab Spring.20 Washington should
encourage Ankara to assume the mantle of a major regional power capable of balancing Iran and cooperating with it at the same time thus ensuring a more secure
and stable regional environment, which welcomes a
new role for a stronger Iran and a new role for Turkey
as a counterbalancer.21 In 2013, President Obama spent
more time in meetings and phone conversations with
then Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan than any other
leader attests to the strategic importance of Turkey for
the United States in the region. Turkey has assumed
a leading support role in Afghanistan and Iraq, mediated between Iran and the West and between Syria
and Israel, while serving as a pivotal geo-economic
force in the neighborhood. Washington and Ankara
have notably kept in check their differences over Iran,
Israel, and the Kurdish issues so as to preserve their
strategic ties and allow more flexibility in their policies.22 Preparing Turkey for the counterbalancer role
should also help Washington ensure that Ankara remains anchored to Western security and economic
institutions despite its eastward push.23
ENHANCING REGIONAL ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT
Iran’s size, geopolitical position, and its geoeconomic potential make it a crucial link in the U.S.
strategy of shrinking the “gap” and promoting the
inclusion of fringe economies into the global economic space. But political impediments and security
concerns surrounding Iran’s nuclear program, among
other issues, have prevented Washington, Tehran,
and numerous regional players from engaging in this
historic venture. The question is not limited to Iran’s
need for economic modernization and integration
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into the global economy after years of relative isolation—itself a major imperative considering the need
for stability in the Middle East. The challenge—and
Iran is a key to solving it—is the economic development and integration of entire regions between themselves and with the world economy. This task is acute
given a series of wars, past and ongoing, which have
put the issue of reconstruction of numerous countries
and societies to the forefront of the economic development agenda of host governments, major players,
and the international community in general. It is also
imperative given the growing importance of global
trade that has emerged as an “ideational fault-line”
among policy elites in the United States in the age of
globalization, with “trade dispositions” increasingly
shaping U.S. “strategic choices (decisions to engage,
contain, and use force) toward geostrategically critical
countries.”24
Iran straddles the Greater Middle East, bordering
parts of the Middle East, the Caspian, and Central and
South Asia, making it a pivotal link in inter-regional
development and integration. On its eastern flank sit
war-torn Afghanistan and terrorism-stricken Pakistan. On its western flank lie disintegrating Iraq and
Syria, as well as divided Lebanon, ravaged as they are
by sectarianism, terrorism, and civil wars. To its south
is Yemen, a tribal state with poor economic performance and prospects of disintegration, struggling (as
Lebanon) to preserve tribal, sectarian, and ethnic balances. Iran’s cultural, economic, and political reach in
all these countries makes it an important development
partner for the United States. Washington should develop measures to plug Iran into emerging transcontinental energy, trade, and transit links in order to generate economic, political, and security dividends for
itself and the greater region.
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A lot of this work is already being done, with or
without the United States. Iran and its partners in the
Middle East have expanded their ties significantly
over the last decade. But it is Iran’s growing relations with Central and South Asian partners that are
overlooked. Iran’s relations with India are facilitating energy, trade, and transit links between Iran and
Central and South Asia, as well as contributing to the
emergence of a strategic Iranian-Indian partnership
and geopolitical rivalry between China and India in
the greater region.25 The sanctions relief provided as
part of the “interim nuclear deal” has led to intensified contacts between China and Iran, as well as India
and Iran, showing the prospects of Iran’s expanding
relations with Central and Southeast Asia. India and
Iran seek to complete the Chabahar port, enabling
them to link with Central Asia and Afghanistan. Currently, Pakistan impedes India’s effort to trade with
Afghanistan, despite allowing some Afghan exports
to reach India. Having the port, to which India has
committed $U.S.100 million after investing $U.S.100
million to construct a 220 kilometer-long road linking
Afghanistan and Chabahar, would be a game changer
for India, Iran, Central Asia, and the United States.
(The port at Chabahar competes with the Pakistani
port at Gwadar, which China helped finance to facilitate energy and trade flows to and from its western
regions.) New Delhi has also recently expressed interest in building a gas pipeline from southern Kazakhstan to India. However, instability in Pakistan and Afghanistan and the standoff between Iran and the West
have impeded India’s imports of energy resources
from Iran and Central Asia. The United States should
facilitate such initiatives as they serve the reconstruction and modernization needs of participating parties,
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contributing to the U.S. vision of an interconnected
and more prosperous world.
The focus on economic infrastructure is important,
not least because of the U.S. military’s need to rely on
it to pursue its own missions, including in Afghanistan and the wider region. The U.S. New Silk Road
Strategy (NSRS), launched in 2011, is a welcome development as it seeks to link Central and South Asia
with each other and the global economy by turning
Afghanistan into a key integration hub.26 However,
the NSRS is a concept more than it is strategy, lacking in resources and commitment by Washington and
its partners.27 The exclusion of Iran from the regional
integration further undermines U.S. economic policy
in the Greater Middle East. A U.S. economic and military policy needs to consider the growing connectivity
within Eurasia, the continent’s own integration with
the global economy, and the role of Iran that connects
volatile sub-regions of the Greater Middle East. In
this light, Washington should encourage Pakistan to
pursue the long overdue $U.S.1.5 billion-worth IranPakistan pipeline to supply gas from Iran’s South Pars
gas field to Pakistan’s energy- and conflict-stricken
Baluchistan and Sindh provinces, as well as support
an extension of this pipeline to India. It should also
encourage Pakistan and Iran—via back channels for
now—to link their respective ports at Gwadar and
Chabahar. Washington should further support the efforts of Iran, India, and Afghanistan to implement a
plan to develop a “southern silk road” linking South
Asia to Central Asia and the Gulf of Oman. The United
States should also facilitate an agreement over water
sharing between Kabul and Tehran in both bi- and
multilateral frameworks and help with regional refugee and border security issues. These small steps could
help build larger trust and enhance U.S.-Iranian ties.28
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Washington should welcome Iran’s efforts to develop infrastructure in Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and
Turkmenistan. Like the United States, India, Central
Asian states, and Afghanistan, Shiite Iran is not interested in the comeback to power of the Wahhabi
ideology-inspired Taliban in Afghanistan, where Tajiks make up one-third of the country’s predominantly
Sunni Muslim population. Iran works closely with
Tajikistan and Afghanistan to prevent this scenario
and to break the relative isolation of all three Persianspeaking countries from regional and global economic
networks. This trilateral partnership is unlikely to
turn into a political or military alliance soon, but it
does enable Iran to increase its influence in Central
and South Asia, especially as it develops railway and
energy links with Turkmenistan, as well.29 A removal
of sanctions on Iran following a nuclear deal and a
U.S. Iranian engagement would open more access for
Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan to global
markets, contributing to regional and global stability
and allowing Washington to utilize its military assets
for new missions.
Washington should also support the development
of confidence-building mechanisms regarding the use
of Caspian energy resources, the challenge which interlinks the divergent and overlapping positions of
Russia, Iran, the Central Asian and South Caucasus
states, and the issue of European energy security.30 A
U.S.-Iranian strategic engagement would prompt Iran
to soften its opposition to Kazakhstan’s and Azerbaijan’s efforts to build underwater pipelines across the
Caspian Sea, facilitating East-West energy and trade
linkages. The unresolved status of the Caspian prevents littoral states from exploiting the region’s vast
energy resources and delivering them to global mar-
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kets. The engagement would allow Tehran and Washington to shape geopolitical dynamics in the Caucasus, where Russia is the strongest actor. It would
also induce Russia and Caspian and Middle Eastern
energy-producing countries to diversify their energy
export-dependent economies once Iran’s and Caspian
exports start inundating regional and global markets.
The United States should also encourage expansion of
trade ties between Iran, Turkey, and Arab countries to
build mutual trust and cooperation while binding the
parties economically.
With time, the United States should leverage
Iran’s own geo-economic capabilities to advance the
region’s internal and external integration. To do so effectively, it could even now open an interest section in
Iran, which the George W. Bush administration considered,31 dealing with economic and other issues. But
it would also need to encourage Iran to solicit assistance from China and India, among others, which are
already spearheading major trade, energy, and transit
initiatives throughout Eurasia that involve Iran and
parts of the Greater Middle East. To start doing it now
means being able to shape the contents and direction
of cross-regional and global economic development
and integration processes for the long haul—an imperative made clear by the rise of emerging powers
capable of challenging the U.S.’s preeminent position
in select regions.32
Iran’s geo-economic position allows it to play a
prominent role in the neighborhood, but its outdated
economy prevents it from utilizing its full potential.
Subject to the progress of nuclear talks and removal of
sanctions, the modernization of the Iranian economy
therefore presents a critical challenge and opportunity for collaboration between Iran and the West. The
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United States and its European and South-East Asian
partners could well remove unilateral sanctions on
Iran now, while keeping UN sanctions in place subject
to Iran’s continued cooperation in the nuclear talks.33
Iran represents a massive market for U.S. goods and
services, especially in the oil, aviation, and computer
industries.34 The United States and its partners would
also do well to promote cultural and economic exchanges, people-to-people contacts, and institutional
arrangements binding Iran to certain commitments,35
while providing it with much-needed FDI and technology transfers to boost its faltering economy. This
would help Iran improve the efficiency of its energy
sector, diversify its energy-export dependent economy, fight its double-digit youth unemployment, and
replenish government coffers. Importantly, it would
enable Iran to better connect with the immediate region and the world, allowing it to participate and
reap benefits of its own growing external economic
engagement and the expanding presence of other actors in the Greater Middle East. However, Iran needs
to accelerate rather than delay measures enabling it
to join the World Trade Organization, especially since
the United States and European capitals dropped their
objection in 2005.36
ADAPTING REGIONAL MILITARY POSTURE
The U.S. regional military posture should enable
Washington to address conventional and unconventional security threats in the Persian Gulf, but
Washington should be careful not to overstretch its
already strained military capabilities, certainly not
at a time when Iran presents an opportunity to ease
U.S. regional military burdens as the United States
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pivots to the Pacific. As some have argued, a major
containment of Iran—centered on policies countering
Iran in Iraq, disarmament of Lebanon, and protection
of the Arab GCC states and their oil production and
exports—would severely drain U.S. financial power,
forcing Washington to spend the equivalent resources
that Rome, Britain, or Spain once spent to run their
now vanished empires.37
Washington should not change its military posture
fundamentally until after a nuclear deal with Iran is
made and both the United States and Iran demonstrate
verifiable commitment to cooperation and normalization of ties. However, it can start adapting its military
policy now by pursuing smaller changes. As it seeks
to do so, Washington should understand a simple reality—it cannot afford another war or significant and
long-term deployments in the Gulf in the conditions
of austerity and its declining influence amid the rise
of new powers. It should therefore adjust its interests
and also focus on diplomacy to retain and enhance its
position globally.38 Its military policy toward Iran and
the region should hinge on explicit steps by Iran toward changes in its regional policies given the level
of uncertainty regarding a nuclear deal, its implementation, and responses to these developments by
U.S. partners.39 It should refrain from military threats
and discussion of regime change against Iran.40 The
United States should therefore back its rhetoric (in his
2013 speech, Obama stated that the United States does
not seek regime change) with specific actions, in return for certain steps by Iran. This is critical given the
impact of the overall narrative of the hostile relationship between Iran and the United States and the need
to deconstruct it to advance positive outcomes.41 As
President John Kennedy instructed in 1962:
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. . . the great enemy of truth is very often not the lie—
deliberate, contrived, and dishonest—but the myth—
persistent, pervasive, and unrealistic. Too often we
hold fast to the clichés of our forebears. We subject all
facts to a prefabricated set of interpretations. We enjoy the comfort of opinion without the discomfort of
thought.42

Regarding U.S. military bases, U.S. Arab partners
could decide to either upgrade or downgrade their
military ties, following a nuclear deal or a U.S.-Iranian
détente.43 In this context, Washington would have to
balance its security commitments to Arab partners
without provoking Iran, while ensuring that it retains
the capability of advancing its regional interests. It
should consider the possibility of downgrading select regional bases to a semi-permanent status, while
transforming the semi-permanent facilities to “lilypads” as part of its Global Defense Posture Review.44 It
could use the freed-up military resources for new missions in the Greater Middle East, the Pacific, and even
Europe to face the increasingly assertive Islamic State
(IS), China, and Russia. Doing so would cut costs and
signal to Iran that the United States is confident with
its resultant posture to meet its security needs and ensure protection of its allies. It would also encourage
Tehran to offer its own quid pro quos. In its message,
this move would be similar to the removal of two U.S.
warships patrolling the Taiwan Straits and easing of
barriers for promoting U.S.-Chinese contact (changes
in shipping, visa, and export regimes) that the Nixon
administration undertook to achieve a détente with
China more than 4 decades ago.45 This, and other measures, then helped Washington to avoid a situation
where, as Henry Kissinger later wrote, the exclusion
of China from “America’s diplomatic option meant
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that America was operating internationally with one
hand tied behind its back”—a situation similar to U.S.
current Iran policy.46
Several factors mitigate concerns about redesigning U.S. regional military posture in case the parties
fail to reach a nuclear deal or détente and, instead,
have to confront each other. Iran does not have a
strong conventional capability. Its military strategy
relies heavily on asymmetric tactics and means—a
deliberate response based on “asymmetrical” and
“extraregional” warfare to the superiority of U.S.
conventional forces.47 Iran would rely heavily on its
ships, submarines, and short range missiles to retaliate against possible attacks, using its significant
number of small boats to “swarm” vessels and laying
mines in the Strait of Hormuz.48 Moreover, Israel and
the Arab GCC states have amassed some of the latest
weapons systems and are arguably better positioned
in some respects to address Iran’s threats to their security. Compared to Iran, as of 2013, the United States
spent almost 70 times more, Saudi Arabia spent more
than quadruple, and Israel spent nearly double on
defense.49 Washington would find it easier to reduce
its permanent presence while keeping a large rotating
temporary presence.50 Washington would also retain
a capability to strike Iran. Specifically, it could use its
carrier battle group: It operates at least one in the Gulf
with dozens of strike aircraft as well as cruise missiles
on surface ships and submarines. It could also use
short-range strike aircraft and strategic bombers from
home, Britain, or Diego Garcia.51
As part of downsizing its military presence and refocusing it after a nuclear deal and verifiable steps toward normalization of U.S.-Iranian ties, Washington
should encourage the Arab GCC states to run select
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military facilities jointly or independently to spread
the costs without significantly undermining the military balance. Washington should also improve the theater missile defenses of its allies and offer them more
specific security guarantees, not just as an end in itself
but as a way to generate leverage vis-à-vis Iran as it
continues its talks with Tehran on nuclear and nonnuclear related security and economic issues.52 If Iran
obtains overt or ambiguous nuclear weapons capability, Washington should signal its readiness to launch
a preemptive strike against Iranian nuclear facilities if
Tehran increased the alert status of its nuclear forces.
Israel should consider “going open” about its nuclear
weapons capabilities in order to boost its deterrence,
including its second strike capability that would be
credible in light of its small territory and population.53
Israel’s current policy is that “Israel will not be the
first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle
East. . . . Nor will it be the second.”54 Finally, Washington should consider extending a “security umbrella”
to GCC states and Israel.55 But Israel may not welcome
the idea if a deal with Iran leads to substantially decreased regional tensions. As a former Israeli official
quipped, “You don’t need an umbrella if there is no
rain.”56
Patrolling the Persian Gulf would remain a priority, even with a reassignment to the Pacific—in the
case of a U.S.-Iranian détente—of one of the allegedly
two U.S. carrier fleets operating in the Persian Gulf
area. Approximately 20 percent of the world’s oil
flowed through the Strait of Hormuz each day as of
2012, with the United States and China being interested in ensuring a secure passage and transit of energy
resources via the Gulf from North Africa, the Middle
East, and Central Asia. While most of this oil comes
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from the Arab countries,57 the expansion of Iranian
oil production and exports in the long run, following
the removal of all sanctions and a nuclear deal, would
change the energy balance (but not the goal of securing energy flows in coordination with various powers,
big and small). As progress is made in the improvement of U.S.-Iranian ties, agreeing to deploy only one
aircraft carrier at any time in the Gulf or the Arabian
Sea in exchange for a gesture from Iran would signal
U.S. intent to reduce tensions with Iran,58 while making it possible to reassign this carrier to the Pacific to
face China’s growing naval capabilities.
The reduction of U.S. military presence—but not
security commitments to its allies—could help mitigate threats and prevent oil supply disruptions given
the overall reduction in regional tensions.59 Iran’s geography—almost all of its coast is cut off by mountains—has ensured a limited role of sea power in
Iran’s military history and thus limited development
of its naval capabilities,60 making it possible to reduce
costs associated with U.S. naval capabilities specifically designed to contain Iran. Of course, the imperative to ensure an adequate number of naval, air, and
ground capabilities to protect oil supplies transiting
via the Gulf should persist. Washington would do
well to start pondering a formula allowing Iran to play
a constructive role in patrolling the Gulf.61 In the short
term, and given the possibility of a conflict rather than
a détente with Iran emerging at any time, Washington
should encourage its partners to use more southern
routes within the Gulf (as water depth allows), which
would not only make the vessels transiting there
harder to hit in case of a possible conflict, but also enable the United States to respond more effectively.62
It should also continue experimenting with surface
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task forces development meant to counter Iran’s unconventional capabilities centered on its speed boats.63
These measures would signal to Iran a less menacing
yet still capable U.S. military posture in the greater
region. Moreover, establishing a hotline on issues of
Gulf maritime security involving the United States,
Iran, and the GCC states would be a welcome effort.64
As U.S. Admiral Mike Mullen stated:
We haven’t had a connection with Iran since 1979.
Even in the darkest days of the Cold War, we had links
to the Soviet Union. We are not talking to Iran, so we
don’t understand each other. If something happens,
it is virtually assured that we won’t get it right—that
there will be miscalculation which would be extremely
dangerous in that part of the world.65

In this context, the United States should negotiate and implement an “Incidents at Sea” agreement
with Iran—as called for by Congressional Resolution
94—following a related study by the Department of
Defense (DoD) on the merits of such an agreement.
Open source reporting indicates that the concept has
not been implemented. But it should be, given a series
of incidents involving Iranian vessels and British warships that may have prompted a military confrontation with Iran.66
The United States should pursue similar initiatives
with countries whose naval capabilities are growing in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The anticipated
military presence of India and China—as some of the
world’s largest energy importers—in these areas and
the Greater Middle East and the Persian Gulf calls for
the pursuit of common understandings and institutionalized platforms enabling a trusted participation
of these actors in patrolling both the highs seas and
the Gulf. This is especially important given China’s
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support to Iran in building anti-access/area denial
(A2/AD) capabilities and projected expansion of U.S.
military presence in the Pacific, where China’s development of advanced A2/AD capabilities strengthens
its territorial claims in the South and East China Seas,
and where chances of miscalculation and miscommunication pose a growing danger to regional stability.67
Washington should ensure it keeps its AirSea Battle
Concept updated to counter A2/AD capabilities of its
potential challengers while seeking to open direct lines
of communication, and have plans in place if China
decides to lease Iranian naval facilities in the Gulf.68
Mending ties with Iran should, in part, mitigate the
growing regional role of China.
In the area of arms sales, the United States should
ensure that the Arab GCC states continue to have access to U.S. weaponry before and after a rapprochement between Tehran and Washington, including
combat aircraft, precision-guided munitions, littoral
combat ships, radar systems, and communications
gear. But it should not upset the conventional military
balance and prompt Iran to pursue nuclear weapons.
In 2012, Washington launched a “U.S.-GCC Strategic
Dialogue” to coordinate missile defense capabilities
of the Arab Gulf states, expressing an interest in providing weapons to the GCC states as a group. Recent
sales include Patriot advanced capability-3 sales to
the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Kuwait and advanced terminal high altitude area defense systems
to the UAE and Qatar. Reports in 2012 indicated that
the United States was installing an early-warning
missile defense radar in the region.69 A year earlier,
Washington agreed to supply arms worth more than
$U.S.100 billion to Saudi Arabia, Israel, the UAE, and
other countries in what is now one of the world’s most
militarized regions.70
89

In case of a U.S.-Iranian strategic relationship that
could conceivably embolden Iran (with or without a
nuclear weapon), Washington could expand the sales
of defensive capabilities, naval and air drills, and integration of partner systems with U.S. missile defense
systems, while being careful not to provoke Iran which
is successfully developing its missile capabilities.71
Tehran’s ballistic missiles program is already fairly
advanced, wielding short-range and medium-range
missiles capable of reaching the entire Middle East
and parts of southern Europe. DoD projects that by
2015, Iran, which has the region’s largest number of
ballistic missiles, could have an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching the U.S. east coast.72 A
2014 DoD report shows that Iran continues to develop
A2/AD capabilities to control the Strait of Hormuz,
advanced naval mines, submarines, coastal defense,
and anti-ship cruise missile capabilities.73
In 2008, Washington agreed with Poland and the
Czech Republic to set up a missile defense system to
counter Iranian ballistic missiles, but later decided to
temporarily switch to ship-based systems, likely as
a quid pro quo for Russia’s support on Iran.74 Washington should continue using this card to encourage
Moscow’s cooperation on Iran, while signaling U.S.
willingness not to design systems specifically targeted
against Iran in return for Tehran’s steps to normalize ties. It should further assist Israel with its shift to
a three-tier missile defense system based on the Arrow II, Arrow III, Patriot, and David’s Sling systems
to offset possible failure with any one or more of the
systems.75 The United States should also continue
cooperation with the Arab GCC states involving the
U.S.-sponsored Integrated Air Defense Center for Excellence built near the air force headquarters in Abu
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Dhabi, UAE. The center is designed to simulate defense against incoming missiles and develop common
responses among the Arab GCC states.76
But Washington should also leverage its arms sales
to Israel and the Arab GCC states to encourage them
to follow a U.S. lead on Iran, while being careful not
to push them too much or irreversibly into an orbit
of rival weapons suppliers, such as Russia and China,
among others. After all, Iran is unlikely to dramatically reverse course in its ties with Israel and Saudi
Arabia shortly following a nuclear deal, given the continued grip on power by Khamenei and the Guards.77
The United States should also be careful to leave more
legal room in its arms sales contracts to maintain
a balance of power in the region that would see an
even more powerful Iran, which itself with time may
be interested in acquiring U.S. weapons. This would
ensure that: a) The Arab states have a stronger sense
of security; b) Iran is aware of the U.S. security commitment to the Arab states; and, c) Washington may
consider selling its weapons to Iran if Tehran normalizes its relations with Washington and cooperates in
addressing regional challenges as a responsible actor.
The United States and its partners should stand
ready for a shift in the capabilities, theaters of operations, and the regional presence of terrorists groups
and demonstrate readiness to cooperate with Iran in
fighting transnational terrorism. The number of attacks by al-Qaeda-affiliated groups skyrocketed between 2007 and 2013, with the IS leading the charge in
2013 (43 percent), followed by al-Shabaab (25 percent),
Jabhat al-Nusrah (21 percent), and al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula (10 percent). Meanwhile, the number of jihadists doubled between 2010 and 2013, with
the war in Syria representing the leading source of recruits.78 Few could predict the emergence of the IS as
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a potent force in Iraq and Syria, let alone its growing
appeal worldwide following expressions of allegiance
to it by militant groups based outside the Middle East.
Washington, Iran, and their partners should all join
forces to prevent radicalization and intercept activities by the IS, al-Qaeda, and a host of other terrorist
groups in the Greater Middle East and South-East
Asia. Just recently, the IS announced efforts to expand
its operational reach into Central-South Asia, while alQaeda created its own South Asia wing and planned
to hijack a Pakistani warship and attack a U.S. Navy
vessel at a base near the port city of Karachi in September 2014. In another case, in November 2014, a threat
of attack on India’s eastern port and city of Kolkata,
prompted India’s navy to withdraw two warships
from the port.79
Washington and Tehran could now focus on counterterrorism efforts in the framework of their relations
and cooperation with key players in Iraq, Afghanistan, and especially Pakistan given its own domestic threat of terrorism and likely increased profile in
Afghanistan’s political and security scene after the
drawdown of U.S. forces from Afghanistan by 2016.80
They should also focus their counterterrorism efforts
on Africa, which is rapidly emerging as a major theater of terrorist planning and operations. With time,
the collaboration with Iran and the resolution or mitigation of conflicts in the Middle East, could free up
military, economic, and diplomatic resources to deal
with reconstruction of Iraq and Syria and emerging
terrorist threats in Africa. Finally, they should stand
ready for the emergence of terrorist groups with hybrid capabilities. The case of the IS shows the emergence of groups capable of using conventional military resources and tactics to pursue political ends of
conquering and holding a populace and territory.
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Furthermore, the United States and Iran already
have an opportunity to collaborate on counternarcotics activities. This concerns the construction, equipping, and manning of border posts along the IranAfghan border as well as sharing of intelligence in
bi- and multilateral settings. Iran sits on some of the
world’s most active narco-trafficking routes emanating from Afghanistan, responsible for production of
some 90 percent of the world’s illicit opiates distributed via Iran, Central and South Asia.81 The involvement of terrorist groups in drug-trafficking calls for
flexible counternarcotics and counterterrorist policies
that benefit from interdepartmental and cross-functional exchanges of expertise and joint activities across
international borders and with participation of several
countries, including Iran. Stemming the production
and flow of drugs is also a major inter-regional economic development concern given the impact of drug
distribution and use on Iran’s and the region’s young
population, corruption, and lost economic opportunities due to the undermined social and health fabric of
local societies. Washington should thus provide logistical and financial support to the UN-backed Triangular Initiative advancing counternarcotics collaboration
among Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.82
ADVANCING REGIONAL
INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY
Construction of institutional frameworks of cooperation in military, security, and economic development areas is a critical task for countries that are embroiled in regional conflicts and are still modernizing
but severely lack cooperation mechanisms trusted by
neighbors or their own citizens. This imperative is
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closely linked with the idea of interconnectedness and
interdependence that proponents of the Peace Theory
argue mitigates the risk of war by advancing the costs
of disruption of created networks. But it offers something more: Institutional frameworks of cooperation
also advance the importance of legal cultures and
rules spanning domestic and international realms for
enhancing national, regional, and global stability. The
Greater Middle East, or “the region of wars” as I call it,
faces numerous conflicts but lacks trusted cooperation
mechanisms despite connections that countries have
built up with each other in select areas. Moreover,
existing and potential conflicts may prompt intervention that would require an expanded role of ground
forces. The U.S. military’s transformation necessitates
the development and introduction of new concepts
of engagement and reconstruction on the ground to
promote peace after waging war—a type of “system
administrators” force concept in order to ensure a
smooth transition from war to peace, associated with
reconstruction efforts and needs.83
In this regard, the U.S.-Iranian competition, as
well as cooperation, has major implications for legal
frameworks, regimes, and governance mechanisms
that together shape the emerging global security and
economic order, making it imperative for the United
States to develop governance frameworks and avoid
situations where its threats to use force are no longer
credible and are strategically damaging.84 The growing profile of Iran and tectonic shifts anticipated following a nuclear deal or a U.S.-Iranian détente further
call for the development of such frameworks to mitigate misperception and miscalculation, to improve
trust and collaboration, as well as to advance security
and stability. The possibility of Iran “going nuclear”
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only adds urgency to pursue this undertaking early
on. As Israel’s former Foreign Minister Shlomo BenAmi asserts:
The question today is not when Iran will have nuclear
power, but how to integrate it into a policy of regional
stability before it obtains such power. Iran is not driven by an obsession to destroy Israel, but by its determination to preserve its regime and establish itself as a
strategic regional power, vis-à-vis both Israel and the
Sunni Arab States. . . . The answer to the Iranian threat
is a policy of détente, which would change the Iranian
elite’s pattern of conduct.85

In the realm of security cooperation and institutionalization, Washington should advance the resolution of regional conflicts by leveraging effectively its
ties with select actors and relying on their assistance
to create a stake for them in the process and demonstrate the benefits of their constructive involvement.
Built-up antagonisms and tensions, including those
that are centered and could be addressed with Iran’s
involvement, make it almost necessary for the United
States to start advancing a multilateral framework of
regional security cooperation involving Turkey, Iran,
Israel, and the Arab states.86 Washington should also
encourage the creation of a Gulf Security Forum that
would assure its members of noninterference, build
mutual confidence, expand crises management and
conflict prevention capacity, and ensure collaboration
against common security threats and economic challenges, among other goals.87 Doing so while increasing
and highlighting the importance of regional cooperation platforms such as the Manama Dialogue is particularly important due to current apprehensions about
the “interim nuclear deal,” the perceived sell-out of
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Arab countries in favor of Iran, and the noninclusion
of the GCC members in the negotiations led by P5+1.
The apprehensions have prompted a Kuwaiti commentator to observe that Arab countries “are not at the
table but on it”88 and have served to undercut a Saudi
position on a U.S.-Iranian détente—“engagement yes,
marriage no.”89
The United States and the Persian Gulf countries
should further develop memorandums of understanding with China and India on ways these actors can assist with regional security needs upon request from
the regional countries in consultation with the United
States. Washington would do well to also promote the
concept and practice of a weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-free zone in the Middle East, especially
given a strong possibility that Iran could obtain nuclear weapons capability and prompt other regional
actors to consider acquiring it. A related task is to start
strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime by
promoting additional protocols and separate treaties,
while developing nuclear forensics capabilities and
a global repository of nuclear material samples that
would help track the proliferation of WMD materials
and discourage their use and proliferation.90
These measures would serve regional stability and
help assuage concerns of U.S. allies, especially Israel,
associated with perceived negative implications stemming from a nuclear deal or a U.S.-Iranian détente.91
After all, Israel and the Arab states may choose to reject
rather than adapt to a nuclear deal, let alone a détente,
and attempt to sabotage both without having to strike
Iran. Israel may forcefully respond to Hezbollah and
Iranian arms shipments to the group via Syria, while
Saudi Arabia may pursue a nuclear weapons capability and more actively support Sunni militant groups
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and political factions targeting Iran’s interests.92 A resultant escalation of tensions or war could engulf other parties, especially given U.S. commitments to allies
and warnings by Iranian leaders that Iran could retaliate against Qatar and Bahrain—the countries hosting
the U.S. Fifth Fleet and Central Command—in a case
of war against the Islamic Republic.
A détente of the Arab states with Iran would lessen the role of Tehran as a “rallying cry” for Muslims
worldwide.93 If Israel and the Arab states chose to
adapt, they would be tempted to increase their collaboration while pursuing missile defense development
and, in Israel’s case, measures to enhance the benefits
of its nuclear posture for deterrence purposes. The
United States should seek to assist and regulate related
measures but explicitly warn its partners that it would
not support a strike on Iran after a nuclear deal (barring extraordinary circumstances or new revelations
about Iran’s noncompliance). In parallel, Washington
should consider extending its nuclear umbrella to the
Arab states in the Gulf, in addition to maintaining
35,000 American forces operating throughout GCC
states as part of Defense Cooperation Agreements.94 It
should further seek to engage both Israel and the Arab
states in regional platforms involving Iran so as to
avoid a possible political split between Israel and the
Arab GCC states on the issue of Iran, as Iran’s growing regional profile may drive a wedge between Israel
and the Arab states.95 Washington and NATO could
also offer NATO membership to Israel, but Europeans
and Israelis may consider twice on this, given the freedom of action that Israel cherishes.96
In the economic sphere, the United States should
encourage actors to develop multilateral trade, energy, and transit initiatives involving Israel, the Arab
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states, Turkey, and Iran. Doing so would advance regional interdependence and ensure that the regional
countries and external actors can more effectively
shape Iran’s gradual or accelerated integration into
the regional economic fabric. It should advance similar initiatives involving Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan,
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan,
Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, based on regional
and cross-regional formats in Central-South Asia, a
region that lacks integration with the global economy.
Iran’s central geo-economic position in the Greater
Middle East suggests the need for the United States to
engage it in economic initiatives of transregional and
transcontinental importance. This need would become
more pronounced, and initiatives of the sort would be
self-propelling, if sanctions on Iran were removed following conclusion of a nuclear deal. Until then, and
as part of a sanctions relief package already provided,
the United States and its P5+1 partners should clearly
demonstrate to Tehran the benefits of economic engagement by enabling Iran to make substantial trade,
investment, and technology transfer deals with P5+1
members (with appropriate clauses allowing the parties to disengage in case of failed negotiations with as
few losses as possible).
In the area of political transitions, the United
States should be careful not to disrupt regional power
balance(s) in the Greater Middle East by spearheading democratization using military or political instruments. But it should be ready to anticipate and channel democratization as a systemic force that can either
upset or advance regional power balance(s). The Arab
Spring, controversial as it is in its manifestations and
implications, has demonstrated the extent of popular
frustration with dictatorial rule in several countries of
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the region and the degree of force that can be brought
to bear by the population—Islamists or secularists—
on the powers-that-be. The ongoing modernization
and integration of the Greater Middle East into the
global economic and security architecture is bound
to proceed with tensions between the modernists and
traditionalists, the Islamists and the secularists, the
democrats and the dictators. The United States should
continue with a democratization agenda as part of its
political rather than military policy, but be more adept at using this tool to promote its multifaceted interests. Where the tensions have built up substantially,
it should engage opposing forces early on to mitigate
any fallout from rapid or sudden political transitions,
especially in relatively dynamic countries that are also
pivotal to the U.S. global strategy: Turkey, Iran, Saudi
Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
WHAT IS NEXT?—PROSPECTS, VISION, STEPS
You cannot prevent and prepare for war at the same
time.
Albert Einstein1

Prospects for the U.S.-Iranian ties to improve are
clearly there, and both administrations should stick to
the plan of agreeing on a final nuclear deal that could
facilitate the emergence of a strategic relationship
between Iran and the United States, which both parties need more than ever in the current conditions of
economic and security challenges and opportunities.
This suggests choosing a route and riding it through
rather than pursing two and not arriving at either destination. Because the U.S. administration for now has
chosen not to engage in war (as it would also inflict
significant damage to itself, its allies, and the region
at large) and because the Iranian administration has
chosen to engage rather than confront Washington,
both parties are in a good position to advance from
the state of estrangement to a détente in the long term.
President Hassan Rouhani already seeks to make
multiliteralism and expansion of ties with global economic institutions a foreign policy priority and a way
to contribute to “global norm-setting.” This fits with
the U.S. vision of its foreign policy under the Obama
administration that has sought more multilateralism
and engagement, including with Iran if it is ready to
negotiate in good faith and for a good purpose. What
both sides now need is extreme will and patience—
107

both demonstrated relatively well recently—as they
continue negotiating on nuclear related challenges
and, increasingly likely, other issues of mutual concern. The United States and Iran should agree that
Tehran’s right to uranium enrichment for civilian
purposes should continue as long as it is a transparent and verifiable process. They should also start exploring, sooner rather than later, possible avenues of
cooperation on counterterrorism and resolution of
regional conflicts.
In the process, neither the United States, nor Iran
should shy away from unilateral gestures, which
should show good will and genuine efforts to find
common ground but which should not compromise
the parties’ fundamental positions or interests without a comprehensive nuclear or non-nuclear accord.
As part of the current sanctions relief package, Washington could already open doors for economic cooperation between the West and Iran, enabling Iran to
modernize its relatively outdated economy. Tehran,
in return, could offer a helping hand to Washington in stabilizing and/or reversing gains of militant
groups in Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen,
and Palestinian territories, saving Washington enormous resources. In this context, Iran’s recent cooperation efforts in response to developments in Iraq (the
advance of the IS and replacement of Prime Minister
Nouri al-Maliki) and Afghanistan (hints of stabilization support) are actions that under a more substantive framework of strategic relations could translate
into constructive regional dynamics aimed at containing/reversing hostile gains.
If Tehran and Washington were to pull it off by
2030, their strategic engagement would allow them to
address a wide range of shared security and economic
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challenges in the wider region, including but not limited to: a relatively insecure transit of energy resources
in, through, and out of Iran as well as via the Strait of
Hormuz, which prevents the United States from redeploying some of its regional military assets to other
regions, especially in the context of the U.S. “pivot”
to the Pacific; prevalent drug-trafficking in the region,
including through Iran; the reconstruction needs following conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, and Afghanistan, which have in part prompted the deployment of U.S. military assets on Iran’s flanks; radicalism
and terrorism targeting Western and Iranian interests;
the relative isolation of Iran and other regional states
from global and regional markets; and Washington’s
continued diminishing global influence.
A constructive and strategic U.S.-Iranian relationship would enable the United States and countries of
the Greater Middle East to facilitate a faster, more secure, and smoother regional connectivity to the world
economy, contributing to the global and regional
economic and security order. Washington could free
up some military resources it currently deploys to
keep Iran in check. This includes the military forces
positioned and rotated into the Greater Middle East,
especially in the Persian Gulf area, the deployment
and use of which could be reformatted and repurposed to deal with pressing challenges elsewhere, as
in Asia and Europe, and/or to address new threats
in the same region. Some of these new threats could
stem from the geopolitical and geo-economic realignment in the Greater Middle East spurred by a possible
U.S.-Iranian strategic relationship. Ultimately, such a
relationship would adjust and overhaul U.S. military
doctrines, policies, and strategies, not only vis-à-vis
Iran but a whole spectrum of countries in this volatile
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region, making it imperative to align military resources with the new vision and goals in a coherent fashion.
This process would be incremental, given the odds of
selective strategic engagement emerging as a more
realistic form of a U.S.-Iranian relationship by 2030.
Whatever the type of strategic relationship emerges, the United States cannot afford to lose its stake in
shaping transformational developments unfolding
in the Greater Middle East and involving Iran. Iran’s
global integration and regional engagement could
advance U.S. global strategy by repositioning and repurposing U.S. regional assets, especially given the
possibility of Iran “going nuclear” and the growing
profile of China and India, which are expected to enhance their regional economic presence by accompanying it with a possible projection of military capabilities in the coming years. Tehran’s agreement to limit
its nuclear program in return for sanctions relief has
already led to intensified relations between China and
Iran, as well as India and Iran, showing the prospects
of Iran’s expanding relations with Central and SouthEast Asia. Shaping these transformational processes is
a key to U.S. global standing for decades to come.
A U.S.-Iranian constructive strategic engagement would enhance the interconnectedness of Eurasia and advance the U.S. post-World War II global
strategy of fostering global connectivity, unimpeded
global trade, and global security. Tehran has already
been seeking to expand its economic ties with Central
Asian countries, which link South-East Asia with Iran
and the rest of the Middle East, by participating in
trade, transport, and hydro-energy projects. These are
the areas of collaboration that Washington, Beijing,
New Delhi, and capitals throughout the continent can
hardly ignore, given the isolation of Central and South
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Asian countries from Eurasian and global markets
and security concerns post-2016 when coalition troops
plan to withdraw fully from Afghanistan. Specifically,
Washington could with time extend its New Silk Road
Strategy, which seeks to develop and position Afghanistan as a trade and transit hub of Central and South
Asia, to the Greater Middle East by incorporating the
active and growing participation of a conveniently
located Iran.
Iran’s participation in the development of transcontinental trade, energy, and transit infrastructure
has direct implications for U.S. military logistics, basing arrangements, deployment of military assets, and
strengthening of institutional and partner military ties
with select regional countries. This is especially so,
given projected geopolitical changes that would spur
a need for new missions in Eurasia and given the resurgence of Russia, China, and India as rising powers
with global aspirations. Washington should therefore
be prepared to face adverse risks stemming from the
realignment of geopolitical relations in the Greater
Middle East following a nuclear accord and, importantly, after a possible strategic détente with Iran by
2030. This primarily concerns the ties between predominantly Sunni and Shiite states, on the one hand,
and the ties between the United States and Saudi
Arabia, among others, on the other.
As they cultivate their strategic relationship, Tehran and Washington should promote confidence ties
in the region. Doing so via institutional frameworks
across defense and other areas—a treaty or an organization including regional parties—would minimize
the fallout of the geopolitical realignment prompted
by a U.S.-Iranian détente and would also prevent major external powers from capitalizing on this realign-
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ment to advance an agenda contrary, detrimental, or
hostile to U.S. global and regional interests. Washington should further design policies to restore a regional
balance of power by engaging the rising Turkey. In
the process, Washington should clearly demonstrate
its commitment to ensuring stability by advancing
cooperation platforms to minimize the prospects of
yet another conflict—especially one involving Iran—
in the Greater Middle East. As Albert Einstein once
said, “You cannot prevent and prepare for war at the
same time.”
ENDNOTES—CHAPTER 5
1. Taken from Trita Parsi, A Single Role of the Dice: Obama’s
Diplomacy with Iran, New Haven, CT, and London, UK: Yale
University Press, 2012, p. 1.
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